Givings by Bell, Abraham & Parchomovsky, Gideon
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2001 
Givings 
Abraham Bell 
University of San Diego 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and 
Evaluation Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Public Economics Commons, and the 
Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "Givings" (2001). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 551. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/551 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001 11/28/01 5:51 PM
547
Givings
Abraham Bell† and Gideon Parchomovsky††
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................549
II. THE LAW OF GIVINGS AND TAKINGS................................................558
A. A Taxonomy of Takings (Takings 101)......................................558
1. Three Types of Takings........................................................558
2. The Takings Controversy.....................................................559
B. A Taxonomy of Givings (Givings 101).......................................563
C. Givings and Takings (Givings 102)...........................................564
1. Cell I: Physical Takings and Physical Givings...................567
2. Cell II: Regulatory Takings and Physical Givings..............568
3. Cell III: Derivative Takings and Physical Givings.............569
4. Cell IV: Physical Takings and Regulatory Givings.............570
5. Cell V: Regulatory Takings and Regulatory Givings..........571
6. Cell VI: Derivative Takings and Regulatory Givings..........571
7. Cell VII: Physical Takings and Derivative Givings............572
8. Cell VIII: Regulatory Takings and Derivative Givings.......573
9. Cell IX: Derivative Takings and Derivative Givings..........573
D. Take It or Give It: The Importance of Givings...........................574
†  S.J.D. Candidate and John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.
J.D., A.B., University of Chicago.
†† Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
This Article greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Ronen Avraham, Ian Ayres,
Hanina Ben Menachem, Omri Ben-Shahar, Rick Carnell, Stephen Choi, Hanoch Dagan, Kirsten
Edwards, Richard Fallon, Claire Finkelstein, Thomas Gommes, Abner Greene, Assaf Hamdani,
Henry Hansmann, Leo Katz, Louis Kaplow, George Lefcoe, Daryl Levinson, Ed McCaffrey, Dan
Richman, Fred Schauer, Steven Shavell, Peter Siegelman, William Treanor, Kaimi Wenger,
Cynthia Williams, Omri Yadlin, Ben Zipursky, and participants in workshops at the Fordham
University School of Law, Harvard Law School, University of Michigan Law School, University
of Minnesota Law School, and University of Southern California Law School. We give special
thanks to Bob Ellickson for the benefit of his wisdom and insights. For excellent research
assistance, we thank Michael Pereira and Kristy Watson. Finally, we are grateful for the support
of the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School.
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
548 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 111: 547
III. W HY GIVINGS? EFFICIENCY, FAIRNESS, AND PUBLIC CHOICE........577
A. The Fairness of Givings.............................................................578
B. The Efficiency of Givings...........................................................580
1. Government Efficiency........................................................580
2. Private Property Owner Efficiency.....................................581
C. The Politics of Givings...............................................................585
IV. I DENTIFYING AND CHARGING FOR GIVINGS.....................................590
A. A Giving or a Taking: Reversibility of the Act...........................591
B. One or Many: Identifiability of the Recipient............................593
C. Give and Take: Proximity of the Act to a Taking.......................596
D. Take It or Leave It: Refusability of the Benefit..........................601
V. PAYING FOR GIVINGS........................................................................604
A. Identifying Chargeable Givings.................................................605
B. Assessing Givings......................................................................605
C. Collecting Charges for Givings.................................................608
VI. DEALING WITH MISGIVINGS.............................................................609
A. Exactions, Special Assessments, Fees, and Taxes.....................609
B. Baselines for Givings and Takings............................................612
C. Administering Givings and Takings...........................................614
D. Charges and Alternative Remedies............................................615
VII. CONCLUSION.....................................................................................618
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
2001] Givings 549
I. INTRODUCTION
Eclipsed by their celebrated twin, takings, givings occupy a crucial yet
barely visible role in the universe of constitutional property law. While
takings—government seizures of property—have been the subject of an
elaborate body of scholarship,1 givings—government distributions of
property2—have been largely overlooked by the legal academy.3 Givings
1. Among the many famous examinations of takings are RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS
(1985); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1995); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); and Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964). For a historical overview of takings, see William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
2. We do not intend “ distributions of property”  to be a precise definition of givings any more
than we mean “ seizures of property”  to be a precise definition of takings. Rather, we seek to
present a broad depiction of the concept of givings. As we discuss throughout the Article, one of
our chief goals is to distinguish between those givings for which a charge should be assessed,
which we call “ chargeable givings,”  and other distributions of wealth by the government that do
not require the assessment of charge, and need not, for convenience’s sake, even be referred to as
givings. In this sense, we note that the takings literature often describes the concept of takings
broadly, while employing a narrower definition of takings (referring only to compensable takings)
where the context so demands. The broad definition helps define the outer boundaries of the
concept, while the narrower use of the term helps guide the finer application of the law. In
general, we acknowledge that the term “ giving”  necessarily partakes of much of the ambiguity of
the term “ taking.”
3. Within the mainstream of legal literature, givings generally have been noticed only in very
narrow contexts such as unconstitutional conditions, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH
THE STATE 3-12 (1993), and offsets, J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and
the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997).
There are three notable exceptions. First, Donald Hagman and Dean Misczynski undertook a
landmark study of windfalls (givings) and wipeouts (takings) in 1978, collecting various studies
of and articles about windfall recapture schemes in the United States, Great Britain, Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand. WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J.
Misczynski eds., 1978). Windfalls for Wipeouts owes an intellectual debt of gratitude to Henry
George’s single tax scheme for taxing away unimproved land value. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS
AND POVERTY (Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1929) (1879). Hagman and Misczynski’s work
precedes the revolution in takings law wrought by cases such as Luc v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and focuses more on practical land planning schemes than
theoretical analysis. Nonetheless, Windfalls for Wipeouts provides an important touchstone for our
work, and we incorporate many of its insights throughout our Article. Using Hagman and
Misczynski’s terminology, Eric Kades engaged in a more extensive analysis of windfalls,
concerning himself with “ economic gains independent of work, planning, or other productive
activities that society wishes to reward,”  rather than specifically with government action. Eric
Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999). A more extensive literature about taxing
windfall gains exists in the field of taxation. E g., ACRS “Windfall” Recapture Proposal, 27 TAX
NOTES 1172 (1985); Alan D. Viard, The Implementation and Rationale of Windfall Recapture, 28
TAX NOTES 1384 (1985).
Second, Louis Kaplow undertook a broader analysis of all government action affecting
wealth—negatively or positively. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). Kaplow thus places the givings and takings question in the broader
context of gain and loss resulting from uncertainty about government action. Kaplow’s insights
are incorporated into our analysis in Part III.
Third, C. Ford Runge and several associates have analyzed “ givings”  and argued for their
importance in examining takings. C. FORD RUNGE ET AL., GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AFFECTING
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are ever-present and yet not discussed. They can be found in almost every
field of government endeavor related to property. Every time the
government “ upzones,”  or changes a zoning ordinance to the benefit of
certain property owners, it has executed a giving.4 Similarly, when the
government relaxes environmental regulations, a giving occurs.5 The same
occurs when the government grants a license to engage in a certain business
or transfers title to land or a lesser property interest to a private actor.6
Other examples are legion.7
Like a reflection in a mirror, the massive universe of takings is
everywhere accompanied by givings. For every type of taking, there exists
a corresponding type of giving. In a recent article,8 we argued that takings
come in three varieties: physical takings, regulatory takings, and derivative
takings. A physical taking occurs when the state seizes a property interest in
order to put it to public use. A regulatory taking occurs when the state does
not seize the property interest, but regulates its use in a manner that unduly
diminishes its value. A derivative taking occurs when a taking (or a giving)
diminishes the value of surrounding property.9 In the same manner, givings
LAND AND PROPERTY VALUES: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF TAKINGS AND GIVINGS (Lincoln Inst.
of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP96CR1, 1996).
4. The taking analogue is downzoning, which may be a compensable taking if it goes “ too
far.”  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415); infra Sections II.C, II.D. Upzoning and downzoning are sometimes
defined differently in different contexts. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAWS 22 (1985).
5. Cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (concluding that environmental regulations depriving land of
“ all economically beneficial use”  effect a taking); Dooley v. Town of Fairfield, 197 A.2d 770,
772 (Conn. 1964) (finding that declaration of an area as a flood plain zone was a taking because
“ the use of the plaintiffs’ land [had] been, for all practical purposes, rendered impossible” ); State
v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (invalidating a wetland protection statute because the
benefit it effected on harmed property owners “ [was] so disproportionate to their deprivation of
reasonable use that such exercise of the State’s police power [was] unreasonable” ); Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963)
(holding a local wetland ordinance unconstitutional because it deprived the landowner of any
reasonable use of the land). More recent cases have taken a more favorable stand on
environmental regulation. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)
(sustaining wetland regulations); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd.,485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984)
(sustaining restrictive wetland regulations).
6. Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
990 (1989) (noting the role of government in distributing license frequencies and arguing for
privatization on First Amendment grounds); Krystilyn Corbett, Note, The Rise of Private Property
Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46 DUKE L.J. 611 (1996) (discussing the property treatment of
frequencies in Telecommunications Act of 1996); cf. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing the expanded role of government in creating property and
wealth).
7. We discuss many other examples throughout the Article. Infra Parts III, IV.
8. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277 (2001).
9. In Takings Reassessed, we defined derivative takings:
[Derivative takings are] a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins. They resemble
regulatory takings in that they reduce the value of property without physically
appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct from regulatory takings in that they may arise as
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come in three varieties.10 A physical giving occurs when the state grants a
property interest to a private actor, such as when it grants broadcasting
rights11 or easements to cable and cellular phone companies.12 In a
regulatory giving, the state uses its regulatory power to enhance the value
of certain private properties. This occurs, for instance, when the state
eliminates development restrictions in wetlands.13 Finally, a derivative
giving is present whenever the state indirectly increases the value of
property by engaging in a physical or regulatory giving or taking. Instances
of derivative givings include the building of a park or the shutting down of
a power plant in a residential area.14 In both of these cases, the value of
nearby property increases as a result of the government action, even though
the government action had no direct physical or regulatory effect on the
nearby property.
Given their importance and ubiquity, how have givings eluded
scholarly attention? To the textualist, the answer is straightforward. The
Fifth Amendment bars only uncompensated takings;15 there is no “ Givings
Clause.”  But the textualist’s answer cannot carry the day.16
the result of a physical taking. And, unlike its cousins, the derivative taking may never
appear alone; it must always be preceded by a physical or regulatory taking.
Id. at 280-81. The existence of cognizable givings, as established in this Article, mandates a slight
amendment to the concept of derivative takings to incorporate the possibility of derivative takings
being created by an underlying giving. See id. at 281 n.14.
10. Infra Section II.B.
11. See, e.g., Charles W. Logan, Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein,
Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Jill K. Pearson, Note, Balancing Private Property Rights with Public Interests:
Compensating Landowners for the Use of Railroad Corridors for Fiber-Optic Technology, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1769 (2000).
13. See Steven W. Watkins, Note, Congressional Attempts To Amend the Clean Water Act:
American Wetlands Under Attack, 72 N.D. L. REV. 125 (1996) (describing recent federal attempts
at reducing wetlands restrictions on private property).
14. Various studies have shown that “ greenbelt”  regulations enhance property values. E.g.,
Mark R. Correll et al., The Effects of Greenbelts on Residential Property Values: Some Findings
on the Political Economy of Open Space, 54 LAND ECON. 207 (1978); G.J. Knapp & A.C. Nelson,
The Effects of Regional Land Use Control in Oregon: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, 18
REV. REGIONAL STUD. 37 (1988); George R. Parsons, The Effect of Coastal Land Use
Restrictions on Housing Prices: A Repeat Sale Analysis, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 25
(1992).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“ [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” ).
16. While we argue that a law of givings is necessary, we do not opine on whether it should
be viewed as a branch of constitutional law, nor on what branch of government should be
responsible for instituting the law of givings. Together, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 and Article
IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution clearly give the federal government the power both to
give and to take; the states already have both powers, without reference to the Federal
Constitution. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment explicitly limits the federal takings
power, and, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment (and interpreted by the Supreme
Court), the state takings power as well. It is not evident, however, that the Takings Clause does
not imply a similar limitation on the federal and state givings power. Indeed, given our claim that
the law of givings is a necessary accompaniment of the law of takings, one might argue that the
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First, takings and givings are so inextricably related that one cannot
have a coherent takings jurisprudence without an attendant givings
jurisprudence. Consider the seminal takings case of Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.17 The City of Detroit seized a
number of private lots in order to transfer them to General Motors for
building a new factory. The court’s decision focused on the question of
whether the seizure satisfied the public use requirement of the Takings
Clause.18 Lacking any background understanding of the role of the state in
givings, the court preferred effectively to read the public use requirement
out of the Takings Clause.19 One imagines, however, that the court’s
decision would have been quite different had it been able to call on a body
of givings law. Instead of dealing solely with the question of whether
landowners’ property could be seized, the court could have addressed the
question of whether the government’s action could properly be seen as a
giving and whether General Motors would properly be required to pay for
the giving.
Second, once one recognizes that relative wealth is a potentially
relevant baseline for examining state actions vis-à-vis property, one realizes
that the barrier between givings and takings is far from clear.20 When the
state takes from Jane Smith, it has made her poorer relative to the rest of the
world. When the state gives to everyone but Jane Smith, it has similarly
made Jane Smith poorer. Yet, current takings jurisprudence is predicated on
the assumption that the relevant baseline against which the government
action is measured is absolute wealth rather than relative wealth; only
diminutions in property value in absolute terms trigger compensation. Once
relative wealth is considered, there is no longer any justification for
continuing to ignore givings. Indeed, in the area of unconstitutional
conditions, constitutional law already recognizes that failure to confer a
benefit may be functionally equivalent to taking away a right.21
Takings Clause implicitly limits both the state and federal power to give. These and opposing
arguments can only be made in reference to broader theories of constitutional interpretation that
are beyond the scope of this Article. In any event, we see no limitation on legislative
implementation of a law of givings.
17. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
18. Id. at 457.
19. See id. (defining “ public use”  broadly).
20. We do not endorse this conception of the Takings Clause on normative grounds.
Nonetheless, relative wealth is a possible baseline for measuring takings, and various studies
suggest that relative wealth is an important determinant of welfare. E.g., ROBERT H. FRANK,
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND 28-35 (1985); FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27-31
(1976) (developing the concept of positional goods); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE
LEISURE CLASS 26-34 (Random House 1934) (1899); Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic
Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN
ECONOMIC GROWTH 89 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974); Richard H. McAdams,
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 18-21 (1992).
21. The Court has indicated:
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Third, the same vices of the political system that give rise to
constitutional protection for property in the Takings Clause also require
protection against unfettered givings. The Takings Clause is meant, at least
in part, to ensure that an organized “ faction,”  in the Madisonian sense,22
does not use its power to enrich itself at the expense of the unorganized
public.23 In the context of takings, the principal concern is that the faction
will enrich itself by converting the private property of unorganized property
owners and bringing it into the public domain.24 In the context of givings,
the major concern is that the faction will enrich itself from the public purse
at the expense of the unorganized public.25 Whether the faction organizes a
taking or a giving, there is reason to worry about the public’s ability to
defend itself from the faction’s predations.
Finally, fairness and efficiency, the concerns animating takings
jurisprudence,26 mandate a givings jurisprudence as well. The efficiency
rationale for the Takings Clause is to ensure that the state exercises its
eminent domain power only when the aggregate benefit exceeds the
aggregate cost.27 Compensation for takings, on this view, forces the state to
[E]ven though a person has no “ right”  to a valuable governmental benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests . . . .
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). But see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(permitting restrictions on speech about abortion in clinics receiving federal funding). See
generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989)
(discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and
Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990) (noting the limitations of the current unconstitutional
conditions doctrine).
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
23. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1690 (1984) (describing the Takings Clause as one of several clauses aimed at curbing
“ naked preferences”  of faction); Treanor, supra note 1, at 836-55 (discussing the importance of
Madisonian political analysis in the drafting of the Takings Clause); infra Section III.C. But see
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 373-77 (2000) (questioning whether modern public
choice theory supports compensation for takings).
24. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1178; see also Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 853-57 (1983)
(using Madisonian analysis for local land-use decisions).
25. See infra Section III.C.
26. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 408 (2000) (“ Takings doctrine is complex and multifaceted; some say
chaotic. If there is some measure of coherence or consensus in this vast and diverse body of
judicial opinions and scholarly commentary, it is that the purposes of just compensation are
essentially two: efficiency and distributive justice.”  (citations omitted)).
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992) (“ The
simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it prevents the
government from overusing the taking power.” ); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings,
Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation”
Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1988) (noting that the compensation requirement
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take into account the cost of its actions.28 However, the efficiency rationale
for takings compensation also dictates that the state properly measure the
benefits of its actions. Just as the state’s failure to internalize the cost of
takings creates fiscal illusion and inefficiency, the state’s failure to
internalize the benefit of givings creates fiscal illusion and inefficiency.29
Takings, when uncompensated, generate negative externalities; givings,
when unaccounted for, generate positive externalities. From an economic
standpoint, neither type of externality should remain outside the state’s
calculus.30
The fairness principle embodied in the Takings Clause is that it is
inequitable to “ forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”31 By the
same token, it is inequitable to bestow a benefit upon some people that, in
all fairness and justice, should be given to the public as a whole. In a
giving, a small group is able to force the public as a whole to subsidize the
group’s preferential treatment. For example, when the state permits logging
companies to chop down trees in national forests for lumber, it is forcing
the public as a whole to surrender natural resources for the private profit of
the logging companies.32
Like current takings jurisprudence, a givings jurisprudence must focus
primarily on two questions. First, when does a giving occur? And second,
when must the state collect a “ fair charge”  in exchange for the giving? This
two-step inquiry parallels the two cardinal questions of takings
jurisprudence. Translating the concept of givings into a coherent law thus
requires many of the same compromises as the law of takings. Just as not
every “ taking”  in the broadest sense is legally cognizable as such, not
every “ giving”  need enter the law of givings.
In this Article, we sketch out a framework for analyzing givings. Rather
than shoehorn all givings into a uniform regime, we devise four conceptual
“ disciplin[es] the power of the state, which would otherwise overexpand unless made to pay for
the resources that it consumes” ).
28. Kaplow, supra note 3, at 567-70 (describing the fiscal illusion justification for takings
compensation).
29. See id. at 567-68.
30. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-
57 (1967) (arguing that property rights arise to effect internalization of externalities, both positive
and negative).
31. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
32. E.g., Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL. L. 613
(1996) (exploring the negative impact of logging on natural resources and taxpayers); Paul
Stanton Kibel, Reconstructing the Marketplace: The International Timber Trade and Forest
Protection, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 735, 744-54 (1996) (explaining the cost of native forest
destruction, and discussing the possibility of a government-logging interest collusion); R. Brent
Walton, Ellickson’s Paradox: It’s Suicide To Maximize Welfare, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 155
(1999) (“ The timber industry has destroyed millions of acres of America’s silva.” ); cf. Garret
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing the difficulty of
preventing overuse of public resources).
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clusters—each embodying a distinct aspect of the givings jurisprudence we
seek to develop. These criteria may be applied by policymakers in
determining whether a giving has occurred and which givings must be
accompanied by a charge to the recipient. We list our proposed criteria by
the order in which the inquiry should proceed.
First, policymakers must determine whether the government act that
bestows a benefit (and potentially constitutes a giving) could be
characterized as a taking were it reversed. For example, if a downzoning of
a certain magnitude would not have been considered a regulatory taking, an
upzoning of the same magnitude should not be seen as a giving. Similarly,
if a demand for a certain amount of funds from a given sector would be
considered a tax or a penalty, rather than a compensable taking, the rebate
of funds in the same amount should be considered a nonchargeable subsidy
or a prize, rather than a chargeable giving.33 Since wealth redistribution is
often seen as a legitimate goal of government34 and constitutes the
cornerstone of programs such as unemployment benefits, it would not be
proper to see all cash distributions as properly chargeable givings.
Second, policymakers must determine the extent to which the recipients
of the giving constitute a readily identifiable group and the degree to which
the giving is available to the public at large. Here, too, the givings analysis
can echo the takings analysis. The provision of public land and subsidized
use of a public arena to a professional sports franchise in a for-profit,
oligopolistic sports league looks very much like a giving.35 The provision of
public education to the public at large on equal terms looks much less like a
giving.
Third, policymakers must determine whether the giving can be clearly
associated with a taking. When, as in Poletown, property is taken
specifically for the purpose of executing a giving, the state should require
the potential beneficiary of the giving to account for a “ private taking,”  in
which the beneficiary directly compensates the owners of property taken.36
This rule would lead to a modified application of a nineteenth-century
33. The line between takings and taxes or penalties is not an easy one to draw. Infra Section
IV.A.
34. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 1, at 1168, 1182; Cass R. Sunstein, O  Property and
Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 918 (1993) (“ Properly understood, the defense of
property rights is a defense of programs of redistribution as well.” ); cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (discussing the role of legal rules and taxation in the redistribution of
income). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 298-99, 314-24 (disallowing redistribution as a public
purpose).
35. See, e.g., Raymond J. Keating, It’s Time To Get the Government Out of the Sports
Business, USA TODAY MAG., Mar. 1, 2000, at 28.
36. Cf. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (allowing private takings by tenant
farmers); infra Section IV.C (discussing the proximity between givings and takings).
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takings rule called the “ benefit-offset”  principle.37 The analysis might also
be tied to the infrequently invoked modern doctrine of average reciprocity
of advantage.38
Fourth, policymakers must determine whether the recipient of the
giving can refuse the benefit bestowed upon her. For example, if the giving
consists of an increase in the permissible floor-area ratio,39 or a similar
exercise of upzoning, the recipient property owner can refuse the benefit by
refraining from building according to the new permissive zoning rules. On
the other hand, where the state builds a park, individual owners lack the
ability to refrain from enjoying the benefits of being in the proximity of the
greenery.40 When owners have the option to refuse the benefit of the giving,
the state should demand immediate payment of a charge for the giving.
Anyone not wishing to pay the charge has the option of refusing to accept
the giving. Conversely, where the giving is not refusable, it looks very
much like a put option, or a government right to force the property owner to
purchase.41 To the extent that such a government power is seen as
objectionable, the sting may be avoided by deferring assessment of the
charge until a later event, such as the receipt of future government
compensation for a taking that may be requested by the giving beneficiary.
For example, owners claiming compensation for a taking occasioned by
37. The “ benefit-offset”  principle allowed the taking party to reduce the compensation to
property owners by the amount of benefit that the taking conferred on the owners’ remaining
property. For discussion, see FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 80-84; Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. AM.
HIST. 329 (1971); and infra Section IV.C. For cases applying the principle, see, for example, St.
Louis & San Francisco Railway v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897); McKeen v. City of Minneapolis,
212 N.W. 202 (Minn. 1927); and Pierce County v. Thompson, 144 P. 704 (Wash. 1914).
38. The doctrine of average reciprocity of advantage originated with Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), who noted that some regulations, while
diminishing the value of property in one respect, could be said to benefit the property owner in
another, such that no additional compensation was required. For example, he explained that a
regulation forcing mining companies to leave intact pillars of coal in abandoned mines was
excused from the compensation requirement because the regulation benefited the mine owners by
protecting the safety of their employees. Id. at 415.
It has never been entirely clear how the concept of “ advantage”  is to be measured in order to
determine whether a given regulation produces average reciprocity. If the value of the advantage
must be precisely equal to the loss, the question of whether there is average reciprocity of
advantage (thereby defeating the need for finding a taking) becomes identical to the question of
whether “ just compensation”  has been paid. On the other hand, if the calculus is looser, as
seemed to be the case in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-35
(1978), some average reciprocity of advantage may be found in any taking of private property. See
Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of
Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990) (arguing for expanded use of reciprocity of
advantage and elimination of compensation whenever the net effect of government action is
positive); infra Section IV.C.
39. “ The floor area ratio measures the amount of floor area relative to total site area,
including all floor space in office and other nonresidential multi-story buildings.”  Frederick W.
Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 373 (1991).
40. See supra note 14.
41. Infra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
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building limitations in an environmentally sensitive area might have their
compensation offset by a charge for the benefit they receive in being
adjacent to greenery, while the remainder of the charge would be assessed
only upon sale of the property.
We mold these four conceptual clusters—reversibility of the act,
identifiability of the recipient, proximity of the act to a taking, and
refusability of the benefit—into a basic model of givings law. The model
has three stages: identifying givings, assessing the value of the givings, and
collecting charges. In the identification stage, the government determines
whether a giving has taken place, and whether it is susceptible to charge. If
a chargeable giving is identified, the government issues a notice of giving
to the beneficiary, triggering the assessment stage. Here, the first two
clusters—reversibility of the act and identifiability of the recipient—are
particularly important. In the assessment stage, the government or the
giving beneficiary assesses the value of the giving for payment of the
charge. Actual payment of the charge occurs only in the third stage of the
process—the collection stage—which is triggered by a realization event.
Sometimes, the realization event occurs at the time of the giving, making
payment for the charge due immediately. At other times, the realization
occurs much later, deferring the charge. In this stage, the last two clusters—
proximity of the act to a taking and refusability of the benefit—play a
crucial role.
Our model of givings is intended to provide three important elements to
future discussions of givings and takings. First, it identifies key ingredients
of the relationship between givings and takings. Second, it proposes a
framework for future consideration of the role and nature of givings. Third,
it presents one possible view of administering a law of givings. This Article
is intended to be a starting point for the discussion of givings. It consciously
invites—and acknowledges the need for—future development and
refinement.
Structurally, the remainder of this Article consists of five Parts. In Part
II, we provide a comprehensive account of the distributional effects of
government actions. We show how givings correspond to takings and
sketch the connections between the two. In Part III, we demonstrate why
theories of takings—whether based on efficiency or fairness—require an
understanding of givings. In Part IV, we divide the universe of givings into
our four conceptual clusters and develop a set of rules to determine for
which givings “ fair charge”  should be collected. In Part V, we sketch out
our basic model for identifying, assessing, and collecting fair charges.
Finally, in Part VI, we address potential objections to our analysis.
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II. THE LAW OF GIVINGS AND TAKINGS
In this Part, we provide a framework for understanding givings and
takings. Following convention, we begin with takings. As we argued
elsewhere, takings come in three varieties: physical, regulatory, and
derivative.42 After expounding each category, we unveil the world of
givings. We demonstrate that it, too, may be divided into three categories:
physical givings, regulatory givings, and derivative givings. Thus, each
type of taking has a giving analogue. Next, we expose the conceptual
relationship between takings and givings. We argue that, in practice, every
taking is accompanied by a giving. Consequently, every relevant
government action involves both takings and givings, and no theory of
takings is accurate without a corresponding theory of givings. Finally, we
explore some theoretical aspects of givings and illuminate the historical and
present importance of givings.
A. A Taxonomy of Takings (Takings 101)
1. Three Types of Takings
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment—the touchstone of
takings jurisprudence—limits the “ taking”  of property to public use and
mandates the payment of just compensation. Despite the seemingly clear
language of the Takings Clause, its original meaning remains obscure.43
Modern courts and scholars continue to disagree about the scope of the
Clause.44 Thus, it is not surprising that takings jurisprudence is considered a
42. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 280-81.
43. Treanor, supra note 1, at 798-818.
44. Compare, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (finding no taking where a state
regulation required owners to cut down red cedar trees infected with a virus that could kill apple
trees), with Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla.
1988) (holding that full and just compensation was required when the state, pursuant to its police
power, destroyed healthy trees); compare Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding a
taking when a statute totally annulled previously existing mining rights), with Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that no compensation was
required when a statute restricting mining activity did not make it impossible for the plaintiff to
engage in profitable mining operations). For academic commentary, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1977) (describing takings jurisprudence as a “ set
of confused judicial responses” ); Coletta, supra note 38, at 299-300 (describing takings
jurisprudence as a “ chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has bred considerable confusion” );
Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent
in Its Effort To Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 308 (1998)
(“ The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s output in this field has by now been demonstrated
time and again by practitioners and academic commentators d nauseam, and I refuse to add to
the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and
increasingly pointless enterprise.” ); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1301, 1304 (1989) (“ [I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and
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leading candidate for the “ doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle
prize.”45
Despite the disagreement on various aspects of the Takings Clause, it is
indisputable that the case law recognizes the existence of two types of
takings: physical takings and regulatory takings. Physical takings involve
physical seizure of or entry onto property.46 Regulatory takings are far more
difficult to define. In the watershed case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,47 Justice Holmes recognized that some government actions not
involving physical occupation of property may nevertheless constitute a
taking if they significantly diminish the property’s value. The focus on
government action that reduces property value naturally suggests a third
type of taking, which we labeled a derivative taking. Derivative takings are
a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins. While a regulatory taking
involves regulating the use of property in a manner that unduly diminishes
its value, a derivative taking occurs whenever a taking—or a giving—
diminishes the value of surrounding property.48 The essential difference
between a regulatory taking and a derivative taking is that in the former
case, the government directly imposes a regulatory burden on the affected
property, while in the latter case, the affected property is not directly
regulated.
The three types of takings may be illustrated with an example. The city
of Bespin seeks to build an airport. It seizes twenty lots for building the
airport itself. In addition, Bespin limits the height of 100 buildings north of
the future airport in order to preserve open air lanes. Finally, as a result of
completion of the new airport, the value of 200 lots adjacent to the new
airport drops by forty percent.49 The owners of the twenty seized lots have
suffered a physical taking. The owners of the 100 buildings placed under
height limitations have sustained a regulatory taking.50 The owners of the
200 lots of diminished value, who have suffered neither physical seizure
nor a direct regulatory burden, have incurred a derivative taking.
2. The Takings Controversy
The Takings Clause has spawned an enormous literature on the
question of when government action enters the crosshairs of the Takings
conceptual disarray.” ); and Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still
a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
45. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993).
46. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
47. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
48. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 279-81.
49. This example is very loosely based upon United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
50. We assume that the restrictions are substantial enough to support a takings claim under
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
560 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 111: 547
Clause, creating a duty of just compensation. For the past quarter-century,
the judiciary has struggled, mostly unsuccessfully, to devise a coherent test
for determining when compensation is necessary.51 The result has been
three per se rules, two discretionary multifactored tests, and a sea of
uncertainty.
First, regarding physical takings, the Court has consistently treated
permanent physical invasions, trivial as they may be, as takings. Thus, a
law requiring property owners to grant an easement to cable television
companies created a taking, even though the total diminution in value
amounted to one dollar.52
Second, in the context of regulatory takings, a regulation that
effectively wipes out the value of a property, unless ascribable to nuisance
prevention, is a taking. Accordingly, a law prohibiting all development of a
beachfront property constituted a taking.53
Third, government regulations that prevent the noxious use of property
do not work a regulatory taking and thus do not require compensation.54 A
municipal ordinance preventing the manufacture of bricks in a residential
area simply curbed a noxious use of property and, therefore, did not work a
taking.55
Outside the realm of the per se rules, a regulatory taking may be
identified by means of an ad hoc inquiry adopted by the Court in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.56 The Penn Central test
requires that courts examine three factors to determine whether a regulation
is a taking: the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, the
nature of the government action, and the degree of diminution in property
value.57
To complicate matters further, regulations of property that fail to meet
certain rationality and proportionality requirements will be deemed takings.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,58 the Court ruled that a taking
occurred when a local government conditioned a land-use permit upon the
property owner’s granting pedestrians permission to cross through the
property. The Court explained that the condition lacked the necessary
rational nexus between the governmental goal (preserving access to the
beach) and the means chosen to pursue it (attaching conditions to a building
permit). Consequently, the Court considered the action a taking rather than
51. See supra note 44.
52. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
54. Id. at 1022.
55. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
56. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
57. Id. at 124.
58. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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a noncompensable regulation. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,59 the Court added
the requirement of a rough proportionality between the government action
and its goal.60 It is uncertain whether these rationality and proportionality
requirements apply to all regulations or simply to exactions—the
conditioning of a government benefit on the payment of a property right.61
In an attempt to clarify this confused picture, scholars have proffered
various alternative tests for identifying takings.62 The most nuanced
position is that of Frank Michelman, who explained that when a utilitarian
calculus demonstrates the net positive benefit of the government action, one
might appropriately let the losses lie where they fall and refuse to pay
compensation.63 However, expressing some skepticism about the utilitarian
approach, Michelman added that demoralization may result from the feeling
of having been victimized by a government taking and should be accounted
for in the utilitarian calculus.64
Various other commentators have proposed that takings be defined with
reference to other social or legal norms. For instance, William Fischel has
suggested that compensable takings should be found where regulations
diverge from social norms.65 In a similar vein, Saul Levmore has argued
that “ [r]esponsibilities that private parties can impose on each other through
the tort system, and thus without compensation, can similarly be imposed by
the government without compensation.”66
Representing the extreme property-rights view, Richard Epstein has
proposed that practically any government action that reduces property
values is a taking for which compensation must be paid.67 At the other end,
surprisingly echoing the welfare state view, Louis Kaplow has questioned
59. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
60. Id. at 391.
61. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1046, 1051-52 (2000)
(“ According to some courts and commentators, the relatively demanding Nollan/Dolan analysis
should apply not only to land use exactions but also to other kinds of regulations and other
government actions that affect private property interests.”  (citations omitted)); Lee Anne Fennell,
Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (2000)
(discussing the various uncertainties concerning the scope of the Nollan and Dolan holdings). But
see City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999) (holding Dolan’s rough
proportionality rule inapplicable to a takings claim based on a denial of a development permit).
62. There have also been attempts to rationalize the doctrine without resort to grand theory.
E.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53
(1990).
63. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1214-24.
64. Michelman recognized the potential unfairness of refusing compensation on utilitarian
grounds, even after taking into account demoralization costs, and he presented a Rawlsian fairness
approach as an alternative to his utilitarian approach. However, he viewed a purely fairness-based
jurisprudence as practically unworkable. Id. at 1245-53.
65. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 351-53.
66. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1991).
67. EPSTEIN, supra note 1. Epstein also sees torts as giving rise to constitutionally required
compensation.
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the grounds for distinguishing compensable takings from other government
actions affecting property values and has expressed some doubt about the
necessity of government compensation altogether.68 Like Kaplow,69
Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld have suggested that privately
supplied insurance for government-induced diminution of property values
might be preferable to a scheme of government-provided compensation;
they concluded, accordingly, that compensation should mimic insurance
and be available only where the owners are highly risk-averse and the
losses large.70
Still other theorists focus on the government’s pre-taking motivation or
post-taking use of the property. Joseph Sax has proposed requiring
compensation whenever the government acts like an enterprise, such as
when it uses the property to provide goods or services, but not when it
arbitrates private disputes, for instance, by preventing noxious uses.71 In a
variation on Sax, Jed Rubenfeld would require compensation for purported
regulatory takings whenever the post-taking property is put to public use.72
As the foregoing demonstrates, the prominence of takings in
jurisprudence and scholarly attention has not yielded clear guidelines as to
when a government action constitutes a compensable taking. Nevertheless,
this inability to delineate the boundaries of takings has not generally been
understood to call into question the validity of the very concept of takings.
As is the case with many constitutional doctrines, takings jurisprudence
consists of a well-defined core—physical takings of fee simples in land—
and an increasing degree of vagueness as one moves toward the margins.
As we show in Part IV, the same uncertainty that shrouds compensation in
the takings context also arises with respect to when givings should be
accompanied by a fair charge. As with takings, the uncertainty at the
margin of givings must not vitiate the viability of the core doctrine.
Similarly, as with takings, a nuanced doctrine of givings can minimize the
uncertainty at the margins and provide a workable test for determining
when a fair charge should be assessed for a giving.
68. Kaplow, supra note 3, at 531, 537, 554. Kaplow writes:
The similarity between the arguments for and against compensation of losses and
taxation of gains suggests that advocacy of one result for losses should be accompanied
by advocacy of a corresponding result for gains. If the common view in many contexts
is that losses should be compensated or otherwise mitigated, while gains can be
ignored, the question is which position should be abandoned.
Id. at 555. Kaplow concludes with “ a general preference for ignoring both gains and losses.”  Id.
69. Id. at 538-41.
70. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 10 RES. L. & ECON. 53, 67 (1987).
71. Sax, supra note 1, at 62-63. Sax later recanted major parts of his theory. Joseph L. Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
72. Rubenfeld, supra note 45, at 1078-81.
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
2001] Givings 563
B. A Taxonomy of Givings (Givings 101)
While the Constitution does not specifically refer to givings in the
manner of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the concept of a giving
is a necessary concomitant of the concept of a taking. Any government
redistribution of private property necessarily involves givings and takings,
and any government destruction of property can be matched with a
government creation of property.73 Takings and givings are two sides of the
same coin. Not surprisingly, therefore, our taxonomy of takings applies
with equal validity to givings.
Like takings, givings fall into three categories. In a physical giving, the
government bestows a property interest upon a private actor.74 A regulatory
giving occurs when a government enhancement of property value by means
of regulation goes “ too far.”75 A derivative giving transpires when, as a
result of a government giving or taking, surrounding property increases in
value even though no direct giving has occurred.
Here, too, an example is apt. Wildwestia has decided to offer the first
1000 homesteaders to arrive in Homestead County the right to seize 100
acres of public land.76 To promote the absorption of the homesteaders,
Wildwestia relaxes zoning regulations in abutting counties, permitting all
residential property (amounting to 2000 lots) to double their built-up area.
Finally, 4000 lots in surrounding counties, not directly affected by the
zoning change, experience a 100% increase in property value as a result of
the homesteading. The 1000 homesteaders have received a physical giving.
The 2000 abutting owners have enjoyed a regulatory giving. The owners of
the 4000 lots of enhanced value have benefited from a derivative giving.
All three types of givings are ubiquitous in reality. Examples of
physical givings include the granting of cattle grazing rights, mineral rights,
and logging rights on public land to private interests, and the transfer of
public land to private entities such as professional sports franchises.77 R al
world instances of regulatory givings pervade zoning law.78 In principle,
73. Cf. Reich, supra note 6 (discussing the role of government in creating wealth).
74. There might also be givings to public actors, just as there are takings from public actors.
See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of
Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1989).
75. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
76. Homesteading acts were a popular form of government giving in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Homestead Act, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976);
Enlarged Homestead Act, ch. 160, §§ 1-6, 35 Stat. 639 (1909) (repealed 1976); Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, ch. 9, § 1, 39 Stat. 862 (1916) (repealed 1976). In citing homesteading acts as
examples of givings, we do not argue that they should necessarily be viewed as chargeable
givings. We discuss the mechanics of distinguishing chargeable from nonchargeable givings in
Part IV.
77. See generally RUNGE ET AL., supra note 3; Bill Johnson, Editorial Notebook: How Fair
Is It for City To Grab Land for Select Firms?, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 11, 1997, at A10.
78. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a definition of upzoning.
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any case of upzoning may constitute a giving. The same is true of grants of
variances, exceptional uses, and even transferable development rights.79
Finally, derivative givings may be found anywhere there are physical and
regulatory givings. For example, when the government builds a new park,
the value of surrounding residential property increases dramatically,
bestowing a derivative giving on the property owners.80 Likewise, any
zoning change that increases (or decreases) the value of the subject property
might also enhance the value of neighboring property not subject to the
change.81
Currently, givings are not a recognized category of law. Givings
implicate no fair charge on the recipient. Often, they are not even taxed.82
As we argue in Part III, this state of affairs is potentially unfair and
inefficient. Overlooking givings may cause a massive misallocation of
resources, impose an enormous cost on the public, and create opportunities
and incentives for political mischief. Moreover, as we show in the
following Section, failing to take account of givings distorts our
understanding of takings.
C. Givings and Takings (Givings 102)
The various types of givings and takings discussed so far are
summarized in the form of a table:
TABLE 1. SIX TYPES OF TAKINGS AND GIVINGS
Physical Regulatory Derivative
Takings Seizure Downzoning New dump nearby
Givings Grant Upzoning New park nearby
Traditionally, takings jurisprudence concerned itself with only two of
these six categories: physical takings exemplified by seizures and
regulatory takings exemplified by downzoning. Elsewhere, we unveiled a
third category—the derivative taking exemplified by the building of a
79. For a description of recent zoning tools such as transferable development rights, see John
M. Armentano, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 27 REAL EST. L.J. 216 (1998); Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer et al., Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB.
LAW. 441 (1998); and Charles L. Siemon, Successful Growth Management Techniques:
Observations from the Monkey Cage, 29 URB. LAW. 233 (1997). As is the case with regulatory
takings, it is difficult to delineate precisely when the use of zoning bestows a giving. See infra
Section II.D.
80. See supra note 14.
81. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8; Parsons, upra note 14.
82. For a discussion of current taxes on givings, see infra Section VI.A.
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nearby garbage dump on condemned land.83 In the preceding discussion, we
have brought to light the three categories of givings in the lower half of the
table: physical (exemplified by land grants), regulatory (exemplified by
upzoning), and derivative (exemplified by the creation of a park on nearby
land). We have also shown that the categories in the top half of the table
have analogues in the bottom half of the table and that each taking has a
potential reciprocal giving, equal and opposite in effect.
In the remainder of this Part, we explore the relationships among the
various types of givings and takings. We show that, in principle, a
government action may combine different categories. Indeed, the ordinary
government action that works a classic taking (physical or regulatory) will
be accompanied by another taking (generally, a derivative taking), as well
as a giving (generally, a derivative giving). This is due to two basic facts
that shape the world of takings. First, the Takings Clause permits takings
only for public use.84 Thus, any taking must confer some benefit on the
public, which will ordinarily come in the form of a derivative giving.85
Second, most physical or regulatory takings produce negative as well as
positive effects on the values of adjacent properties, creating derivative
takings.86
We show that any type of giving or taking may be accompanied by any
other type (or types) of giving or taking. Moreover, we show that givings
and takings are legal Siamese twins and that certain combinations of
takings and givings may be anticipated. The presence of those combinations
produces important insights into the distributive effects of government
actions regarding property. These insights provide the informational basis
for crafting the doctrine of givings and takings.
To further the discussion of the analytic relationships among the
various categories, we use the following table, representing the central
combinations of givings and takings. We have numbered the cells in order
to facilitate the discussion. It should be noted that the table is necessarily
incomplete, as it does not reflect the possibility of the most common type of
government action—one that simultaneously creates more than one type of
giving or taking. Nevertheless, it suffices to demonstrate the illuminating
power of examining givings and takings together.
83. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 280-81.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
85. More broadly, Kaplow has noted the importance of taking account of benefits created by
government policy because “ policy change is presumably undertaken in order to generate net
gains in social welfare.”  Kaplow, supra note 3, at 552.
86. See RUNGE ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-20.
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TABLE 2. COMBINED TAKINGS AND GIVINGS
            Taking
Physical Regulatory Derivative
I. II. III.
P
h
ys
ic
a
l
Hawaii Housing
Authority
v.
Midkiff
St. Louis &
San Francisco Railway
v.
Mathews
Poletown
Neighborhood Council
v.
City of Detroit
IV. V. VI.
R
e
g
u
la
to
ry
Nollan
v.
California Coastal
Commission
Penn Central
Transportation Co.
v.
New York City
Boomer
v.
Atlantic Cement Co.
VII. VIII. IX.
  
  
  
  
   
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
  
G
iv
in
g
D
er
iv
a
tiv
e
Miller
v.
Schoene
Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v.
Mahon
United States
v.
Causby
Currently, takings law tends to treat all cases as if they were outside of
this table altogether, ignoring givings in determining compensation.
Consider the following example. Gotham City amends its zoning ordinance
to impose a height restriction on the neighborhood of Bellevue. As a result
of this change, Belinda Belle, a property owner, is deprived of the ability to
add another two floors to her ranch-style home. She claims that the change
constitutes a regulatory taking, as a result of which she is entitled to
compensation in the amount of $40,000.87 Belinda has a neighbor, Clarence
Clearsight, who enjoys a view of the sea from his living room that would be
blocked by Belinda’s proposed second floor. The value of this view to
Clarence is $40,000. Under current law, the case is treated as being outside
the table. Belinda will collect a later sum whose present value is $40,000,
and Clarence will pocket the $40,000 in improved value. In a givings
analysis, however, the taking from Belinda, when properly understood, is
also a giving to Clarence. This is a Cell VIII case, in which it might be most
appropriate for Clarence, rather than the public, to compensate Belinda.88
Ironically, takings jurisprudence can be blind to the possibility of
givings, even when the recipient of the giving is identical to the person
87. We assume, for purposes of this example, that the height restriction constitutes a
compensable regulatory taking. Under Penn Central’s multifactor test, the precise determination
is highly fact-specific. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978); supra
Subsection II.A.2.
88. We discuss this remedy further infra Section IV.C.
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
2001] Givings 567
suffering the taking. Imagine, in the previous example, that Gotham City’s
newly imposed height restrictions create an air of exclusivity in Bellevue,
eventually raising the value of all homes in Bellevue, including the value of
Belinda’s home, by a future sum whose present value is $40,000 (again,
making this a Cell VIII case). Thus, Belinda’s loss from the foregone
opportunity to build a second and third floor is offset by her subsequent
gain due to the greater value of the neighborhood as a whole. Under the
current legal system, which focuses exclusively on harm at the time of the
taking, Belinda could collect $40,000 in compensation for the lost
opportunity to build, and later collect another $40,000 for the increase in
neighborhood property values—an anomalous outcome by all accounts.
Takings law avoids this result only if the gain to Belinda is incorporated
into the oft-neglected concept of average reciprocity of advantage.89 In this
case, Belinda would likely receive compensation under existing law, since
Belinda’s gain is unrecognized, leading the courts wrongly to treat the case
as not belonging in the table.
Cell VIII cases are not alone, nor do they exist solely in the realm of
hypotheticals. As we show, there is no shortage of cases that can be placed
in the several cells of the table. By analyzing these cases with an eye
toward givings, we demonstrate the importance of a givings analysis for
takings.
1. Cell I: Physical Takings and Physical Givings
Physical takings are not infrequently accompanied by physical givings,
as illustrated by the case of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.90 In
Midkiff, the State of Hawaii confiscated property of large landowners to
redistribute it to the erstwhile tenants. The Court determined that the giving
(the redistribution) constituted a “ public use,”  and since Hawaii paid
compensation for land confiscations, the Court found no constitutional
infirmity. Importantly, the Hawaii legislation linked the givings to the
takings. Hawaii seized property only when more than half of the tenants of
89. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-45. Lynda Oswald observed that the average reciprocity of
advantage has undergone a dramatic, and unfortunate, transformation through time:
Simply put, in its original form, the rule stated that a land use regulation that resulted in
benefits to regulated landowners roughly equal to the burdens imposed on them did not
violate the United States Constitution. In its modern, corrupted form, however, the
average reciprocity of advantage rule states that if a land use regulation results in
benefits to society as a whole roughly equal to the burdens imposed upon the regulated
landowners, no taking has occurred. As a result of this perversion, the average
reciprocity of advantage rule has lost its former potency as a tool for distinguishing
valid police power actions from invalid regulatory takings and instead has become a
method for simply rubberstamping legislative acts.
Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the “Harm/Benefit” and “Average Reciprocity of Advantage”
Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1489 (1997).
90. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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that property expressed an interest in purchasing it. The purchasing tenants
would then pay the former landlords directly for the seized property at a
negotiated price or at a price set by the condemning court.91 This system,
which did not occupy the attention of the Supreme Court, is an exemplary
model of linking takings compensation with givings charges.92 Although
Hawaii adopted it only for Cell I cases, the same approach to compensation
and charge is, in principle, equally applicable to other cells.
A less congenial approach is represented by the case of Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,93 to which we return in our
discussion of Cell III. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that
Detroit’s scheme of physical takings from landowners and a physical giving
to General Motors did not require General Motors to pay just compensation
to the harmed owners. Among its many vices, Detroit’s approach depleted
public funds by more than $200 million, as the liability for compensating
harmed owners greatly exceeded anticipated costs.94
2. Cell II: Regulatory Takings and Physical Givings
Cell II cases are rarer, but may be found in situations similar to those in
St. Louis & San Francisco Railway v. Mathews.95 A landowner had sued the
St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company for property damages
resulting from a fire ignited by sparks thrown off by the company’s
locomotives. The Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statutory scheme that
departed from the common-law negligence rule and imposed strict liability
on railroads, while granting railroad companies the power to condemn land
for tracks. The pairing of a physical giving (in the form of the land grants to
railroads through private takings) and a regulatory taking (in the form of an
enhanced liability standard) effectively forced the railroad companies to
keep their property, tracks, and locomotives in good repair.96 The
heightened liability standard also offered neighboring landowners some
91. Id. at 233-34.
92. We develop this idea further infra Section IV.C.
93. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
94. Tina Lam, De-Stadium, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 17, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Detroit Free Press File; Protect the Taxpayers, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 19, 1999, at A10.
95. 165 U.S. 1 (1897).
96. While we refer to the enhanced liability rule as a “ taking,”  we do not mean thereby to
imply that it altered a form of property rule protection, rather than liability rule protection. Nor do
we assert that the enhanced liability standards would necessarily be recognized as regulatory
takings under any of the legal standards currently used. Rather, we point to the “ taking”  in its
broadest sense—an adverse impact upon the property value as a result of a change in the
legislative scheme.
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
2001] Givings 569
compensation for the involuntary taking of their land, as it increased the
value of the adjacent property that was not condemned.97
The Supreme Court did not directly discuss Missouri’s compensation
scheme for landowners whose property was seized. As we explain in Part
IV, most nineteenth-century jurisdictions permitted railroads to use the
benefit-offset principle in determining the proper level of compensation for
the physical taking.98 In one sense, the benefit-offset principle was ideal, in
that it offset compensation for takings from a landowner by the value of
givings to that landowner. Thus, the railroad companies and the state were
forced to take into account the true effect on the seized landowner’s
property. The problem with this scheme lay elsewhere. As William Fischel
noted in his summary of the historical evidence, railroads increased the
property values of all surrounding farmland. Thus, application of the
benefit-offset principle to takings compensation, while ignoring the
derivative givings bestowed upon all neighboring owners whose land was
not physically affected, created the ironic situation in which the one
property owner who paid a charge for a giving was the owner whose land
was seized.99
3. Cell III: Derivative Takings and Physical Givings
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit100 is, at first blush, a
Cell I case, in which land was physically taken from some Detroit
landowners in the Poletown neighborhood and physically given to General
Motors to allow GM to build a new automobile manufacturing facility.
Upon closer examination, however, Poletown can also be placed in Cell III.
The physical giving to GM resulted in losses in property values not only to
the owners whose property was directly seized, but also to neighboring
owners whose property values sank due to proximity to the new factory.
Prior to the physical giving, Poletown was a thriving, ethnically diverse
community. Subsequent to the giving, GM’s new plant and parking lot
occupied most of the neighborhood.101
97. Some commentators concluded that railroads received excess subsidies and homeowners
inadequate compensation. E.g., FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 80-81; Scheiber, supra note 37, at 362-
65.
98. See infra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
99. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 83-84. An additional problem was direct subsidy of
construction costs. See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
100. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
101. See Peter E. Millspaugh, Eminent Domain: The Emerging Government/Business
Interface, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 167, 167 (1982).
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4. Cell IV: Physical Takings and Regulatory Givings
Real world examples of physical takings matched with regulatory
givings abound, and they can be seen in such phenomena as exactions102
and incentive zoning.103 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,104 one
of the leading exaction cases, the California Coastal Commission had
conditioned the granting of a development permit for the Nollans’
beachfront property on the Nollans’ yielding an easement to the public over
their property. The Court ruled that the state’s taking of the easement, even
in the form of an exaction, constituted a physical taking.105 The existence of
a regulatory giving in the form of a development permit—placing the case
in Cell IV—entered the Court’s analysis only as part of the question of
whether the state had constitutionally exercised its police powers.106 Had
the Court been more conscious of the presence of a giving, it could have
ruled that a taking had indeed occurred, but that the state had adequately
compensated the Nollans for the taking by providing the regulatory giving.
Similarly, incentive zoning involves the granting of additional zoning
rights (a regulatory giving) in exchange for the dedication of private
property to public uses, such as parks and plazas (a physical taking).107 The
additional zoning rights are intended to serve as an “ incentive”  for the
provision of public amenities. As a result, incentive zoning is difficult to
distinguish from cases involving exactions, like Nollan and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,108 and some commentators have concluded that it should be viewed
as a physical taking.109 In principle, we do not oppose this view, but it only
captures half of the picture. The additional building rights (or incentive
zoning rights) constitute a regulatory giving for which the recipient should
be charged.110
102. An exaction is the conditioning of a government benefit on the payment of a property
right. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. A narrower definition of exaction would presume
the wrongfulness of the condition and view the payment as improperly compelled. Se  BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 581 (7th ed. 1999).
103. See David J. Benson, Bonus or Incentive Zoning—Legal Implications, 21 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 895 (1970); Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments
on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991)
(“ Through the land use regulatory technique formally known as ‘incentive zoning,’ cities grant
private real estate developers the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for their
voluntary agreement to provide urban design features such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and
social facilities and services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job training.” ).
104. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
105. Id. at 841-42.
106. Id. at 833-37.
107. See Kayden, supra note 103.
108. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
109. See Peterson, supra note 62, at 78-79.
110. The difference between exaction and incentive zoning terminology might be seen as a
question of where the baseline building right is seen to lie. If the building rights are viewed in
some sense as already inhering in the property, the demanded public amenity should be called an
“ exaction.”  However, if the building rights are viewed as a gift by the zoning authority given as a
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5. Cell V: Regulatory Takings and Regulatory Givings
Examples of regulatory takings matched with regulatory givings are
similarly numerous. Interestingly, takings law has sometimes taken account
of a regulatory giving to the victim of a regulatory taking, allowing takings
law to take account of Cell V of the givings-takings table. Consider, for
instance, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.111 In analyzing
whether a zoning restriction that prevented the plaintiff from building an
office tower above Grand Central Station constituted a regulatory taking,
the Court took note of the municipal scheme of transferable development
rights (TDRs). Using TDRs, Penn Central could transfer some of the
“ taken”  development rights to adjacent properties.112 Translated into the
terms of a givings analysis, the Court placed the government action into
Cell V, allowing it to take account of the regulatory giving when deciding
whether the elimination of development rights over Grand Central Station
amounted to a regulatory taking.
Although the Court heeded the fact that Penn Central received TDRs,
the Court did not explicitly analyze the grant in terms of givings. Instead,
the Court considered the grant of TDRs as a factor affecting the magnitude
of the appellant’s loss, as part of the determination as to whether a
regulatory taking took place.113 We argue that a better way to account for
the TDRs is to acknowledge the existence of a taking and view the TDRs as
a giving distinct from the taking, which may be viewed as separately
chargeable, although the charge and compensation may offset one another.
6. Cell VI: Derivative Takings and Regulatory Givings
In light of the fact that neither derivative takings nor regulatory givings
are part of classic takings vernacular, it is not surprising that little explicit
recognition of Cell VI cases may be found in the case reporters.
Nevertheless, situations characterized by regulatory givings coupled with
derivative takings underlie cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.114
In Boomer, community property owners brought a nuisance suit against the
Atlantic Cement Company for pollution emitted by the defendant’s cement
plant. Instead of enjoining the pollution, the New York Court of Appeals
reward to those who provide public amenities, the additional building rights should be referred to
as incentive zoning rights. See also infra Section VI.A.
111. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
112. Id. at 114.
113. Id. at 137.
114. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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permitted the cement plant to continue operating in exchange for a one-time
payment of “ permanent damages.”115
Although the case involved the tort of nuisance, the decision can be
seen, and is indeed perceived by law and economics scholars, as having
effectively worked a taking on the homeowners.116 Under our terminology,
the taking is a derivative one, deriving from a regulatory giving. Atlantic
Cement, on the other hand, benefited from what can be treated as a
regulatory giving. The Boomer court effectively changed the existing
regulatory framework and permitted Atlantic Cement a new profitable use
of its property that would have been enjoined under the common-law rules
of nuisance.117
7. Cell VII: Physical Takings and Derivative Givings
As we noted earlier, the “ public use”  requirement of the Takings
Clause makes derivative givings likely companions of physical takings.
Miller v. Schoene118 is one of the numerous takings cases properly assigned
to Cell VII. In Miller , the state ordered the destruction of cedar trees on
Miller’s lot in order to prevent the spread of a fungus to nearby apple tree
lots. Miller suffered a physical taking—without compensation—while his
neighbors received a derivative giving. However, the Court closed its eyes
to the givings half of the picture and determined that, as a result of the
public benefit, no compensable taking had taken place.119 A better result
would have been similar to that of Boomer, absent the valuation problems:
The apple tree farmers should have been charged for the benefit to their
properties, and Miller should have received compensation.
United States v. Cors120 is an even more interesting Cell VII case. Cors
involved a Navy decision during World War II to requisition a tugboat and
to pay compensation. While both sides acknowledged the existence of a
compensable taking, they disputed the magnitude of the award. The Navy
claimed that it need not pay for the part of the tugboat’s value attributable
115. More precisely, the court granted the residents a conditional injunction to be vacated
upon the payment of permanent damages. Id. at 874-75.
116. E.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1039-40 & n.46 (1995) (using Boomer as an
example of a private takings case).
117. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875-76 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The Boomer decision has
proved controversial on many grounds. See Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice,
Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (Peter Hay &
Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988). In retrospect, we can see that the court underestimated the
damage to the plaintiffs. Id. at 11-12. There is also room to question whether the court, exercising
its equitable powers, was the proper institution to effect the giving and takings. See NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 14-28 (1994).
118. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
119. Id. at 280.
120. 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
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to the general rise in tugboat prices that occurred with the onset of war and
the requisitioning of maritime vessels. Accepting this argument, the Court
ruled that the tugboat owner was entitled to the market value of the vessel,
but not to its additional subjective value to the government. In addition, the
Court instructed that market value should not include the holdout
component inherent in the market for maritime vessels at the time. Viewed
through the prism of givings, the decision is laudable as it takes account of
the derivative givings produced by the government’s program of physical
takings, i.e., its requisitioning of vessels.121
8. Cell VIII: Regulatory Takings and Derivative Givings
Pairings of regulatory takings and derivative givings are similarly
numerous. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,122 arguably the most famous
of all regulatory takings cases, belongs in Cell VIII. Pennsylvania Coal,
owner of the subsurface property, suffered a regulatory taking, but the
surface property owners received derivative givings as a result of the
reduction in the likelihood of subsidence. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council123 presents a similar combination. Prevented from developing his
beachfront property by anti-erosion regulations, Lucas suffered a regulatory
taking. But more inland properties that enjoyed access to an open beach
enjoyed derivative givings. In each case, a requirement that the benefiting
properties pay a charge for the givings would have considerably simplified
measurement of the efficiency and equities of the regulation.
9. Cell IX: Derivative Takings and Derivative Givings
As we have defined the concepts of derivative givings and derivative
takings, it is impossible for the two to be matched in the absence of a
predicate physical or regulatory giving or taking.124 Nevertheless, there are
cases dominated by the pairing of derivative givings and derivative takings.
United States v. Causby,125 in which the Court found that a new airport
created physical takings of property directly overflown by airplanes, could
be placed in Cell IX. The overflights in Causby harmed the values of many
properties abutting the airport not directly overflown by aircraft using the
121. The case invokes—and resolves admirably—a number of other challenges undergirding
the laws of givings and takings. Chief among these challenges are issues of valuation, see infra
Section V.B, framing of the transaction, see infra note 239, and time of measurement, see infra
Section V.C.
122. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
123. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
124. For a justification of this limit on the definition of derivative takings, see Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 290-92.
125. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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airport. Thus, Causby involved many more derivative takings than physical
takings.126 However, the new airport in Causby also doubtless created a host
of derivative givings for nearby hotel owners and the like. The derivative
givings, like the derivative takings, belong in a full accounting of the costs
and benefits of the government action.
D. Take It or Give It: The Importance of Givings
The enormous body of scholarship on takings,127 especially in contrast
to the near complete absence of givings scholarship,128 would lead one to
believe that takings are infinitely more important than givings. In fact,
givings play at least as prominent a role in public life as takings and, quite
likely, an even greater role.
Government largesse is widespread.129 Broadly defined, givings can be
found in any government action that bestows a benefit upon someone.130
Whereas the power to take is the province of such specialized government
powers as eminent domain and taxation, the touchstone of nearly every
other power of government is giving. Indeed, even the takings power is
required, ultimately, to benefit the public.
One might argue that no restrictions on givings are necessary because
the Constitution does not create a power to bestow benefits parallel to the
power of eminent domain. However, the argument collapses in light of the
fact that nearly every power of the government should ultimately be seen as
a power to benefit some or all members of the public.131 If a limitation on
takings is mandated by possible abuses of the power of eminent domain, a
givings jurisprudence is necessary to prevent abuses of the other powers of
the government. As we will show, the possibility of abuse in the case of
givings may be even greater than in the case of takings. This is due to
several important differences between givings and takings.
Although takings must always be accompanied by givings due to the
“ public use”  proviso of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
opposite does not hold true. A government can bestow certain benefits
without creating corresponding harms. For example, the government can
upzone a particular neighborhood without creating a matching loss in
property values. In this sense, the symmetry between givings and takings is
not perfect, and the government can take advantage of this fact. Givings
126. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 279-80.
127. See supra notes 1, 44.
128. See supra note 3.
129. See RUNGE ET AL., supra note 3.
130. See supra note 2.
131. Indeed, this makes a formal powers analysis an unlikely candidate for framing the law of
givings. However, a powers analysis may remain useful in the context of takings. See infra
Section IV.B.
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may produce winners without producing identifiable losers, making givings
a very attractive policy tool. Givings that harm no identifiable person may
not attract public attention and are unlikely to lead to legal challenges. The
dark side, of course, is that the government may abuse its power to reward
political supporters.
Armed with this insight, it is easy to see that in certain cases the givings
power dominates the power of eminent domain. Assume that in Poletown,
the city of Detroit had two options to satisfy GM’s demand for a bigger
plant. The first was to condemn the property of Poletown’s residents and to
give the land to GM. The second was to grant GM a variance to expand the
capacity of one of its existing properties. If the latter option were available
in reality, Poletown would not be the famous case it is now. Indeed, in
ordinary circumstances, Detroit and other municipalities would prefer the
second option since regulatory givings do not visibly impoverish the public
fisc, and consequently, they give rise to less political criticism.
Furthermore, the government can use its budget in ways that benefit
some but not others. For example, a municipality may decide to build a new
park in neighborhood A, but not in neighborhood B. As a result of the new
park, real estate prices in neighborhood A may increase by fifteen percent,
while real estate prices in neighborhood B remain the same. Formally, no
taking has occurred because the residents of neighborhood B are no worse
off now than they were before. However, given that municipal budgets are
limited—indeed, budgetary decisions are often zero-sum games132—the
decision to bestow the benefit upon the residents of neighborhood A is a
lost opportunity to the residents of neighborhood B. Yet, as long as the
decision of the municipality is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, it will
stand, and no account will be taken of possible allocative injustice.
This observation implies another interesting difference between takings
and givings. While takings imposing a considerable loss on an individual or
a group are likely to attract attention and generate legal challenges, givings
with the opposite effect might not. Victims of takings who suffer a
considerable personal loss will find it cost-effective to pursue public and
legal action. For givings, however, the costs involved in organizing the
nonrecipients may lead to inaction unless the magnitude of the giving is
great. The recipient of a considerable benefit will likely be pleased with the
giving. The public at large may not be content with the decision, but when
the cost of the giving is spread thinly over a large population and imposes
an inconsequential cost on each individual member of the public, the cost to
each individual of opposing the giving is likely to outweigh the benefit.133
132. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 503 (1998) (discussing the “ zero-sum nature of
federal allocative decisions” ).
133. We develop this point further infra Section III.C.
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These characteristics of givings can create opportunities for political
abuse that cannot be matched by takings. Imagine that Peter Politician is the
corrupt mayor of Sellout City. Peter raises cash for his reelection campaign
by granting zoning variances to his corrupt developer friends Barry Bagman
and Cody Cashncarry. For each $1 million in zoning variances, Barry and
Cody donate $1000 to Peter’s campaign. Peter also takes revenge on
enemies such as the honest developers David Dogood and Edward
Eleemosynary by downzoning their property. However, other than the
psychic enjoyment of making David and Edward suffer, evil Peter realizes
no gains from his takings. While political abuse for the sake of spite via the
takings power should not be discounted, there is good reason to suppose
that Peter will often find the financial attractions of kickbacks from givings
more appealing.134
The role of givings in political abuse is hardly restricted to hypothetical
situations. The distribution of government benefits has provided the
lifeblood of debilitating scandals throughout the history of the United
States. The eighteenth-century Yazoo land scandals, for example, resulted
from the Georgia legislature’s giving of huge land tracts at grossly
understated prices to four land companies. Until then, Georgia had
distributed land on the “ headright”  system, which allowed families to
claim land for each family member, up to a maximum of 1000 acres.135 In
the wake of the Revolutionary War, however, Georgia began making large
land grants to favored individuals, and in the Yazoo transactions, Georgia
sold tens of millions of acres to the four Yazoo companies for a small
fraction of their true worth. Motivated by bribes, the Yazoo transactions
subsequently brought in numerous innocent third parties that bought land
from the land companies. Litigation, rebellion, and even a small war
resulted, casting a cloud on national and state politics for several decades.136
The nineteenth-century Crédit Mobilier scandals emerged from givings
associated with the construction of the Union Pacific railroad. The Union
Pacific Railroad received givings of land and cash subsidies from the
134. Takings may also present opportunities for financial gain for the corrupt. Barry Bagman
may wish to sell his property in Cercla Estates, but he may be unable to find a buyer. In exchange
for an appropriate campaign contribution, Peter might arrange for Barry’s property to be
confiscated by means of eminent domain. Peter might also threaten a taking for inadequate
compensation in order to extort contributions. Nevertheless, such a situation differs from the
givings example in that it would involve a victim with an incentive to turn to legal authorities.
135. We discuss the differences between grants to singled-out individuals or companies, on
the one hand, and grants to the public at large, on the other, infra Section IV.B.
136. C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO (1966). The Yazoo land frauds provided the background
for the Supreme Court’s landmark decision on the Contracts Clause, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87
(1810). See also Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional
Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73 (2000) (discussing cases illustrating that takings were “ the
paradigmatic constitutional taboo”  during the nineteenth century).
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government in order to build a low-traffic railroad.137 While the railroad
was unlikely to produce high revenues, the construction—thanks to the
subsidies—proved to be quite profitable. Investors created the Crédit
Mobilier company to perform the construction work and bribed members of
Congress with Crédit Mobilier shares to continue subsidies. The scandal
undermined the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant and later implicated
President James A. Garfield and presidential candidate James G. Blaine.138
The twentieth-century Teapot Dome scandal, also called the Oil
Reserves or the Elk Hills scandal, involved Secretary of the Interior Albert
Fall’s giving of sweetheart leases over conservation land to several
petroleum companies in exchange for cash “ gifts”  and “ loans.”  The land
had been set aside to preserve petroleum reserves for future emergencies,
and Fall, who opposed the policy, used the givings to prevent land
conservation and enhance his personal wealth. Fall became the first former
cabinet officer to be jailed, and a Senate investigation prompted the first-
ever appointment of special counsel by the President—the forerunner of the
independent counsel.139 A North Dakota senator labeled the affair the
“ slimiest of slimy trails beaten by privilege.”140
Givings retain the power to produce scandal. Insufficient accounting for
givings in the form of pork barrel politics has rightly drawn criticism from
nearly all quarters.141 In all, there is real reason to suspect that the power to
give is a major source of potential corruption and mischief.
III. WHY GIVINGS? EFFICIENCY, FAIRNESS, AND PUBLIC CHOICE
Having demonstrated the prevalence and importance of givings, we
next explain why, in principle, a government that compensates for takings
should also assess charges for givings. We show that the animating
137. The Pacific Railroad Acts granted 12,800 acres to railroad companies for every mile of
track laid, as well as $48,000 for every mile laid in mountainous terrain. They also subsidized
loans. See Act of July 3, 1866, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 79; Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356; Act
of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
138. DAVID HOWARD BAIN, EMPIRE EXPRESS (1999).
139. A. Timothy Martin, The Development of International Bribery Law, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’ T 95, 97 (1999). For a discussion of these and other prominent cases of
corruption, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
140. LEASES UPON NAVAL OIL RESERVES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CONTINENTAL TRADING
CO. (LTD.) OF CANADA , SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 70-1326, pt. 2, at 3 (1928).
141. E.g., Kimberly Kindy & Hanh Kim Quach, Proposed Budget Most Pork-Laden Yet,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 15, 2000, at A1 (“ The problem is the entire budget has become a
grab bag of pork-barrel projects.”  (quoting State Senator Tom McClintoch)); Larry Sandler,
Amtrak Critic Wants Thompson Ousted, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 13, 2000, at 1B (“ When
you add pork-barrel trains to carry very few people through rural districts represented by powerful
congressmen . . . that is the opposite of what is needed.” ). In one notable, and apparently
facetious, exception, a recent essayist proclaimed: “ Pork is good. Pork is virtuous. Pork is the
American way.”  Jonathan Cohn, Roll Out the Barrel: The Case Against the Case Against Pork,
NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 20, 1998, at 24, 28.
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concerns of takings jurisprudence—fairness and efficiency—apply with
equal force to givings and demand a givings doctrine. Because givings must
be understood in political context, we draw on public choice literature to
support our claim that lack of a givings jurisprudence undermines good
government.
A. The Fairness of Givings
From the vantage point of fairness, the law of takings is concerned with
the allocation of burdens; our proposed law of givings focuses on the
allocation of benefits. Justice Black famously summarized the fairness
concern of the Takings Clause in Armstrong v. United States,142 explaining
that the “ Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”143 By the
same token, fairness concerns should bar the government from allowing
some people alone to enjoy benefits that in “ in all fairness and justice”
should be enjoyed by the public as a whole.
Unaccounted-for givings have the potential to create distributive
injustice by allowing a select few to benefit disproportionately from the
public’s limited resources. Just as it is inequitable to single out members of
society to bear the burden of societal needs, it is inequitable to privilege a
few by permitting them to enrich themselves at the expense of the public.
Distributive justice demands that the government allocate burdens and
benefits in accordance with some principle of equality.144 To be sure,
theorists of different political bents will disagree about the precise meaning
of equality in this context, and even as to whether equality is the supreme
value.145 However, all theorists agree that the government must not allocate
benefits on the basis of one’s ability to exploit the political system. The
government must not discriminate among its subjects based on favoritism
borne of improper political influence.146
Furthermore, in the same way the takings power may be used by those
with the greatest political influence to cast burdens on the least well-off,147
the givings power may be used to the disadvantage of society’s weakest
142. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
143. Id. at 49.
144. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 165 (1958).
145. See WILL KYMLICKA , CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 50-94 (1990).
146. See Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1670.
147. See, e.g., Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON.
473, 487-88 (1976) (studying exercises of eminent domain in Chicago, and finding that the
indigent—i.e., those with lower-value property—were consistently undercompensated relative to
affluent property owners).
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members. The likely recipients of givings are politically influential
individuals or factions.148 The ability of the politically powerful to extract
benefits for themselves invariably comes at the expense of the politically
disenfranchised—individuals and groups with insufficient political clout
and limited financial resources. This unhappy result stems from two
different, yet related, phenomena. First, the same political process that
distributes benefits imposes burdens and collects taxes. Thus, when the
government collects taxes from both Alice and Beth, and then gives the
revenues to Alice, Beth is indirectly paying for Alice’s benefit. Second, by
making Alice better off relative to Beth, Beth’s position in society has been
relatively worsened.
Both takings and givings generate demoralization, albeit differently. In
his classic treatment of takings, Frank Michelman observed that “ a visible
risk of majoritarian exploitation”  might cause an individual to “be paralyzed
by a realization that [she is] at the mercy of majorities.”149 Unlike other
misfortunes that might befall one’s property to which one can psychologically
adjust, a government decision to burden particular individuals thrusts upon
them “a perception that the force of a majority is self-determining and
purposive, as compared with other loss-producing forces that seem to be
randomly generated.”150 Thus, “even though people can adjust satisfactorily
to random uncertainty . . . they will remain on edge when contemplating the
possibility of strategically determined losses.”151 Logically, this
demoralization will occur not only after takings, but also after givings. While
people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity, when the
windfall arrives as a result of a strategic and deliberate decision of the
government, the reaction may turn to resentment and frustration.
Recall our earlier discussion. Givings and takings are intimately linked.
Government largesse is not manna from the heavens. It does not come free
of charge, and it does not benefit everyone in the same way. Takings, as we
have shown, are generally accompanied by givings.152 It would be
inconsistent to argue that fairness requires compensating takings but
permits ignoring givings. Our goal here is not to develop a meta-theory of
fairness for determining when the government can take and when the
government can give. For our purposes, it is enough to show that fairness,
as understood in the context of takings, mandates accounting for givings.153
Admittedly, a degree of vagueness inheres in any theory of takings or
givings, since there is no scholarly or judicial consensus regarding the
148. See RUNGE ET AL., supra note 3.
149. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1216-17.
150. Id. at 1217.
151. Id.
152. Supra Section II.C.
153. In this Part, we do not provide criteria for determining when givings call for a charge.
We defer that discussion to infra Part IV.
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definition of property. Here, too, we make no pretense of providing a clear
definition that simplifies the complexity of property. We merely point to the
fact that notwithstanding divergent understandings of property,
uncompensated takings of property are generally understood to violate the
demands of fairness.154 The same is true of givings.
Of course, government services are not a Procrustean bed.155 One
cannot expect at the end of the day to find that all citizens have received
identical benefits and have borne identical burdens. However, systemic bias
against the least well-off cannot be condoned by any theory of fairness.
B. The Efficiency of Givings
1. Government Efficiency
Assuming that the government behaves as a rational wealth-
maximizing actor—an assumption we revisit and revise in the next
Section156—it will bestow benefits on members of the public only when the
overall benefit of the act to the government exceeds its aggregate cost.157
Given this framework, the goal of takings jurisprudence is to end the fiscal
illusion created by the government’s ability to impose harms on individuals
without paying compensation. Under traditional takings analysis, the just
compensation requirement effectively forces the government to internalize
the cost of its decisions and impose burdens only when the net gain of so
doing exceeds the cost. Fiscal illusion will persist, however, if the
government fails to consider givings.158
Economic efficiency is achieved by taking into account both costs and
benefits.159 Takings jurisprudence ensures an accurate accounting of costs.
Givings jurisprudence is necessary to guarantee an accurate accounting of
benefits. Consider the following example. Mirage City is considering the
154. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 764
(1999); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,
112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998-1002 (1999); Michelman, supra note 1, at 1218-24.
155. Procrustes, in Greek mythology, had one bed for all. Those who were too tall for the bed
had their legs chopped off, while those who were too short were stretched to fit. EDITH
HAMILTON , MYTHOLOGY 210-11 (1942).
156. Infra Section III.C.
157. As a normative theory, economic efficiency prescribes that “ law should be made to
conform as closely as possible to the dictates of wealth maximization.”  RICHA D A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 362 (1990).
158. A government suffering from fiscal illusion labors under the misimpression that the true
net value of its action is reflected by the effect on the government’s budget. Lawrence Blume &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569,
621 (1984).
159. Law and economics literature generally employs a Kaldor-Hicks wealth-maximization
criterion for efficiency. See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 4 (1997). Analyzing
takings from the viewpoint of the citizen victim, Kaplow argued that there is no economic
justification for failing to treat gains precisely like losses. Kaplow, supra note 3, at 553.
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construction of a new exit to the interstate highway. The actual cost of
building the roadway is $1 million. In addition, the government will have to
pay $2 million to property owners whose land will be condemned for the
project. We assume that no derivative taking occurs in this case, and thus,
the total cost of the project is $3 million. Turning to the benefit side, the
government estimates that the new exit will spur economic activity in a ten-
block area of Mirage, raising local property values in that area by $5
million. As a result, Mirage’s income from property tax revenue will
increase by $100,000.160 Under the assumption that Mirage acts like a
wealth-maximizing individual, it will reject the project. By Mirage’s taxes-
and takings-influenced calculation, the project will lead to a net loss of $2.9
million.161 However, if Mirage took into account both takings and givings, it
would see that the project produces a net benefit of $2 million.162 Since
economic efficiency is concerned with aggregate efficiency, Mirage’s
decision is clearly welfare diminishing.
Importantly, even if the government is not treated like a rational
wealth-maximizing individual, as long as government is subject to fiscal
illusion, unaccounted-for givings and takings may distort government
incentives.163 This is due to the fact that, as long as government action is
distorted by the illusion that harms and benefits are costless, government
action will be most accurate if government takes into account the full set of
costs and benefits occasioned by its behavior. While there is little empirical
data to suggest that government acts precisely like a wealth-maximizing
individual, there is data showing that government does operate under fiscal
illusion.164
2. Private Property Owner Efficiency
Uncompensated takings and unaccounted-for givings may distort
allocative efficiency in an additional way. The absence of government
compensation or charge may lead individuals to make inefficient
investment decisions. It bears emphasis that this matter is a point of
160. This figure represents the present value of the future revenue stream to be created by
property taxes.
161. The $2.9 million loss represents the difference between the $3 million in costs and the
$100,000 in revenues.
162. The $2 million gain represents the difference between the $5 million in societal benefits
and the $3 million in costs.
163. Our fuller treatment of the incentives on government behavior appears in Section II.C.
Due to distributional effects among voters, as well as the nonuniformity of nonpecuniary factors,
such as ideology, that affect government and the electorate, distorted incentives may persist even
in the instance of a mechanism that compensates for fiscal illusion.
164. See studies discussed in FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 96-97; and Joseph J. Cordes & Burton
A. Weisbrod, Governmental Behavior in Response to Compensation Requirements, 11 J. PUB.
ECON. 47 (1979). See also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 291 n.53 (referring to studies).
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contention among economists. While certain economists posit that
uncompensated takings spur inefficient investment by property owners,
others claim it is actually the payment of compensation that distorts
individual investment incentives by creating a problem of moral hazard.165
We do not attempt to resolve this theoretic dispute. We merely aim to show
that the same analysis employed to demonstrate the distortionary effect of
uncompensated takings can be applied to show the distortionary effect of
uncharged-for givings.
Thus, our analysis proceeds on the premise that government
intervention is different from other risks facing property owners. This
premise is not shared by Kaplow166 or Blume and Rubinfeld;167 they argue,
rather, that risk of government action is no different than any other business
risk, such as natural disaster or marketplace changes. Accordingly, Kaplow
and Blume and Rubinfeld have argued that takings compensation creates a
moral hazard because it encourages inefficient investment that fails to
account for the risk of government taking. Thus, they urge elimination of
takings compensation as they would givings charges.168 Miceli has rejoined
by pointing out that the government is, in turn, affected by the acts of
market actors.169 Thus, for example, the government will refrain from
taking property from actors who overbuild in reliance upon government
compensation for takings, since the government will not want to overpay
for its taking by compensating for excessive building.170 For Miceli, too,
there is a necessary symmetry between takings compensation and givings
charges: Just as compensation prevents takings from overbuilders, charges
prevent givings to underbuilders. This can be seen in the following
examples.
Once again we begin with a taking, based on one of Miceli’s
examples.171 Suppose that Alison Apartment owns a building of two floors
worth $200,000, in which each floor is worth $100,000. Alison knows that
if the second floor were in the hands of the public (for example, if the
second floor were removed, allowing the public to enjoy the air and view
above the building), the floor would be worth somewhere between $50,000
and $150,000, with an equal chance of any value between these two
extremes. Alison knows, moreover, that the city will take the second floor
through downzoning if the floor’s value in public hands exceeds its value in
165. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 158, at 597-98.
166. Kaplow, supra note 3.
167. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 158, at 584-89.
168. Kaplow, in particular, notes repeatedly the symmetry between the upside and downside
of the risk of government action. Kaplow, supra note 3, at 553-55.
169. See MICELI, supra note 159.
170. This assumes the ready availability of substitutes for the property that would be taken.
171. Thomas J. Miceli, Do Governments Provide Efficient Compensation for Takings?, ILL.
REAL EST. LETTER, Winter/Spring 1993, at 8, 9.
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Alison’s hands. Thus, Alison estimates that the likelihood that the city will
seize her second floor is 50%.172 Finally, we assume that there will be no
compensation for taking, as Kaplow and Blume and Rubenfeld suggest.
Alison can enhance the value of her second floor by $1000 by adding
external ornamentation at a cost of $1001. Ordinarily, she would not
undertake the expense of adding the ornamentation, since it would lead to a
loss of $1. However, once Alison takes into account the effect on the
taking, she will undertake the expense. The $1000 change in value of the
second floor will raise the value of the second floor in Alison’s hands,
without changing the value in the public’s hands, thereby lowering the
likelihood of a downzoning. Specifically, the likelihood of downzoning will
be lowered from 50% to 49%.173 The 1% reduction in the probability of an
uncompensated downzoning is worth $510 to Alison.174 Thus, the added
ornamentation is worth a net $509 to Alison ($1000 in greater value plus
$510 in reduced chance of taking, less a cost of $1001). Failure to pay
compensation for a taking has thus led to inefficient building.
The same distortive effect obtains with regard to failure to charge for
givings as well. Suppose that Alison has only a one-story building, worth
$100,000, and she seeks a giving of an upzoning allowing her to add a
second floor worth $100,000. Once again, Alison knows that the value of
the space in the hands of the public (as open air) is worth somewhere
between $50,000 and $150,000, with an equal chance of any value between
these two extremes. Alison knows that the city will give her building rights
through upzoning if the floor’s value in Alison’s hands exceeds its value in
public hands, and the public will demand no charge for the giving. Alison
therefore estimates that the likelihood that the city will give her a second
floor is 50%.175
Alison can now encourage the giving by underbuilding. Suppose that
Alison has the option of building an inferior roof over the first floor that
would be perfectly suitable as a median roof between the first and second
floors, but is inappropriate as a roof for a one-floor building. Suppose that
using this inferior roof reduces the value of Alison’s first floor by $1001.
Additionally, suppose that due to the presence of a roof better suited to a
two-story building, the value of a second floor in Alison’s hands is
increased by $1000. Absent the possibility of an uncharged giving, Alison
would install a proper roof. The distorting effect of an uncharged giving,
however, leads Alison to install the inferior roof. The presence of an
inferior roof increases the chance of a giving by 1% to 51%.176 The 1%
172. Based on the following calculation: ($150,000 − $100,000)/($150,000 − $50,000) = 0.5.
173. Based on ($150,000 − $101,000)/($150,000 − $50,000) = 0.49.
174. Based on (0.5 × $100,000) − (0.49 × $101,000) = $510.
175. Based on 1 − [($150,000 − $100,000)/($150,000 − $50,000)] = 0.5.
176. Based on 1 − [($150,000 − $101,000)/($150,000 − $50,000)] = 0.51.
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increase in value due to an uncharged upzoning is worth $1510 to Alison.177
Thus, the inferior roof is worth a net $509 to Alison ($1510 in greater
likelihood of giving, less $1001 in reduced value of the first floor). Failure
to assess a charge for a giving has thus led to inefficient building.
While the inefficient building as a result of uncompensated takings may
seem more intuitively appealing than inefficient building stemming from
uncharged givings, real-world examples of the latter phenomenon abound.
The incentive for mismanagement—or inefficient use of resources—caused
by givings underlies the renowned phenomenon of children breaking toys in
order to receive newer ones. Of course, such strategic behavior is not
confined to the family. Several years ago, as part of a lobbying effort to
convince New York City to build a new stadium in Manhattan for the New
York Yankees, George Steinbrenner played up in public appearances the
problems of transportation to Yankee Stadium, focusing on lack of parking
and congested roads. In so doing, Steinbrenner reduced the value of his
property interest in the Yankees by lowering attendance and goodwill, with
the aim of drawing a giving from municipal government. Had he wanted,
Steinbrenner could have taken even more drastic steps to lower the value of
his property to induce the giving. For example, he could have opened
vendor booths in existing parking lots in order to reduce the number of
parking spaces. Likewise, he could have changed the layout of the seats in
the stadium to decrease the number of skyboxes and luxury seats.178
In sum, our efficiency analysis shows that uncharged givings lead to
two potential distortions. First, from the vantage point of the government,
uncharged givings, like uncompensated takings, create fiscal illusion and
lead to inefficient policies. Government failure to account for the benefits
of givings may lead to failure to undertake economically efficient projects.
Second, the possibility of uncharged givings also may distort the
investment decisions of individuals, thereby further skewing allocative
efficiency.
177. Based on (0.51 × $101,000) − (0.5 × $100,000) = $1510.
178. See Matthew Purdy, Yankees Look Away from Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, § 1,
at 45 (citing criticism of Steinbrenner for driving down attendance with negative comments about
Yankee Stadium and the surrounding neighborhood); Vivian S. Toy, Streak Alive as Yankees Veto
13th Stadium Plan in a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at B3 (noting Steinbrenner’s criticism of
traffic and parking problems in arguing for greater municipal assistance). For an interesting
discussion of the advantages of reducing the value of one’s property in interactions with private
actors to diminish the risks of theft or conversion, see Douglas W. Allen, Creating Wealth by
Destroying It: An Extension of Demsetz’s Theory of Property Rights (Mar. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). Naturally, Allen does not discuss givings. Nor does he address
the implications of his analysis for takings.
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C. The Politics of Givings
In the previous Section, we evaluated the effects of fiscal illusion on
government incentives and explained why failure to consider givings may
distort efficiency. In this Section, we demonstrate that a more complex
view of government decisionmaking buttresses the conclusion that failure
to account for givings may result in inefficiencies. Using the tools of public
choice analysis, we show that decisionmaking about givings is highly
susceptible to improper influence and rent-seeking at the public expense.
Public choice theories of government view government decisionmakers
as maximizers of their narrow self-interests, primarily maintaining power.179
On this view, government decisions do not aim to promote some concept of
the public good or to maximize social welfare.180 Nor can government
actions be traced to a cost-benefit analysis aimed at maximizing
government wealth. Rather, government decisions result from majoritarian
or interest-group rent-seeking to which decisionmakers cater in order to
maintain power.181 Less cynical scholars suggest that the truth probably lies
somewhere in between the pure rent-seeking view of politics and the
simplistic view of Pigouvian theorists, in which government serves as the
neutral servant of the public good.182
Whatever the precise mix of rent-seeking and good government, there
can be little doubt that givings are among the chief means of distributing
largesse to interested parties183 and that failure to account for such givings
allows exploitation of the political process.184 The giving to General Motors
described in Poletown,185 for example, has been criticized as a flagrant
wealth transfer from ordinary residents of a mixed-ethnic neighborhood to
the more politically powerful General Motors.186 Even more disturbing is
the magnetic effect of givings toward corruption. Givings allow the
unscrupulous to tap the vast resources accumulated by the government in
state coffers. So long as givings do not give rise to a charge, influential
individuals may use a small amount of campaign contributions to induce a
much larger giving.
In interest-group models of public choice, pioneered by Mancur
Olson,187 well-organized interest groups are able to manipulate the
179. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 22-24 (1991).
180. This view is generally, if not entirely accurately, referred to as Pigouvian. See FISCHEL,
supra note 1, at 203-04.
181. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 179.
182. See id.
183. For a discussion of the differences between subsidies and givings, see infra Section
IV.A.
184. See supra Section II.D.
185. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
186. Millspaugh, supra note 101, at 180.
187. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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government and ensure activity that benefits the interest group at the
expense of society. Interest-group public choice theory would interpret the
Poletown episode as the politically influential General Motors extracting
rents from the ill-mobilized citizens of Detroit. Ironically, as Daryl
Levinson has noted, compensation for takings (absent the assessment of
charges for givings) may increase the likelihood of interest-group
exploitation of the public fisc.188 Takings compensation spreads the price of
interest-group rent-seeking over the entire public, reducing the likelihood
that any given interest group will oppose the takings plan. It is only by
charging interest groups for givings that the incentive for feeding at the
public trough can be defeated.
However, even without positing corruption or self-dealing by the
government, public choice theory demonstrates the need for a givings
regime. This can be seen by examining Daryl Levinson’s recent attempt to
craft a majoritarian public choice model of the incentive structure of
government decisions on takings. Levinson’s model, by demonstrating the
possible distortions created by mandatory compensation for takings,
inadvertently highlights the need to incorporate charges for givings into a
takings regime.189
In his majoritarian model,190 Levinson imagines decisionmakers who
vote precisely according to the preferences of the majority of citizens,
where each citizen’s preference corresponds precisely with her pecuniary
self-interest.191 In this basic model, certain skewings of the costs and
benefits of government action will lead the government to take property
inefficiently and pay compensation. Suppose, for example, that the city of
Democracy decides to take Citizen 1’s $100,000 property and turn it into a
park, resulting in givings worth $11,000 to each of Citizens 2 to 10.192
Suppose further that the compensation of $100,000 to Citizen 1 is paid by a
tax levied on all 10 citizens. The net value of the taking and givings to
society is a loss of $1000. The taking and givings are therefore inefficient
because the property in Citizen 1’s hands is worth $100,000, while its value
as a park in Democracy’s hands is only $99,000. However, since nine
188. Levinson, supra note 23, at 376.
189. Id. Levinson discusses the difficulties with the takings regime, but does not discuss the
possibility of creating a jurisprudence of givings. He does occasionally allude to the possibility of
accounting for benefits. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
190. Levinson offers three distinct models of government decisions on takings—one based on
majoritarian decisionmaking, one based on interest-group power, and one based on bureaucratic
aggrandizement. Levinson, supra note 23, at 361-87.
191. Id. at 363-64.
192. Our example is a slightly modified version of Levinson’s. See id. at 364-66. The
terminology of givings is ours. Levinson refers to “ benefits.”  Levinson presumes that the person
from whom the property is taken can be excluded from the benefits. While this presumption is
unlikely in our simplified example, it is quite possible in more complex real world situations.
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citizens benefit and only one loses, the taking and givings will take place.
The results are summarized in the following table:
TABLE 3. MAJORITARIAN PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL
WITH TAKING COMPENSATION
Citizen Taking Benefit Tax
Compen-
sation
Net
Value Vote
1 −100,000 0 −10,000 100,000 −10,000 No
2 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
3 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
4 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
5 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
6 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
7 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
8 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
9 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
10 0 11,000 −10,000 0 1,000 Yes
Society −100,000 99,000 −100,000 100,000 −1,000 Yes
Levinson concludes that even a compensation regime for takings will
not eliminate inefficient takings and majoritarian distortions. A givings
regime, however, could eliminate the distortion.193 Suppose that
Democracy, in addition to paying compensation for takings, would now
assess charges for its givings. Each of the nine recipients of the giving
would be assessed a charge equal to the value of the giving received
($11,000). Each of Citizens 2 to 10 would enjoy a benefit of $11,000 as a
result of the park, as before, but each would also have to pay $11,000 in
givings charges as well as $100 in taxes (to fund compensation for Citizen
193. While Levinson does not suggest a regime for assessing charges for givings, he does
acknowledge that if “ compensation were financed from a tax on regulatory windfalls, only
efficient regulations would win majority support.”  Id. at 366. In Section VI.A we demonstrate the
inadequacy of the alternative of taxing givings.
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1 in excess of the givings charges), resulting in a net loss of $100 to each
citizen. Citizen 1 would also suffer a net loss of $100, since she would lose
her land worth $100,000, receive compensation worth $100,000, and pay
taxes in the amount of $100. Thus, all ten citizens would vote against the
proposal, since each would lose $100. The introduction of a givings charge
results in full internalization of the economic effects of one’s vote,
spreading the loss across the entire population, and leading the citizens of
Democracy to reject the inefficient taking and givings. The results are
shown by the following table:
TABLE 4. MAJORITARIAN PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL WITH TAKING
COMPENSATION AND GIVING CHARGE
Citizen Taking Benefit Tax
Compen-
sation Charge
Net
Value Vote
1 −100,000 0 −100 100,000 0 −100 No
2 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
3 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
4 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
5 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
6 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
7 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
8 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
9 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
10 0 11,000 −100 0 −11,000 −100 No
Society −100,000 99,000 −1,000 100,000 −99,000 −1,000 No
A regime for assessing charges for givings thus eliminates the problem
of inefficient takings prompted by self-interested decisionmakers and
restores the proper incentives for efficient government decisionmaking.
A third type of public choice analysis emphasizing agency problems in
decisionmaking in government democracies would sound a more cautionary
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note about extensive accounting for givings.194 This analysis focuses on
government bureaucrats as decisionmakers, positing that they are primarily
interested in expanding their own budgets as a way of aggrandizing their
power. Levinson argues that such bureaucrats will not be deterred from
taking by compensation. On the contrary, Levinson posits, compensation
expands government budgets without any corresponding increase in
responsibility for the bureaucrat, creating a perverse incentive to take too
much property.195 A similar argument might be made regarding givings.
Importantly, however, the establishment of a direct compensation channel
between givings beneficiaries and takings victims mitigates the bureaucratic
agency problem.196 Direct transfers of money from benefited property
owners to harmed ones will diminish the opportunity for government self-
aggrandizement.
Accounting for givings generates another desirable result: better
information about the distributional effects of government actions.
Currently, it is very difficult to determine which individuals, or groups,
benefit from governmental redistributions of wealth, and moreover, whether
the effect of government policies with respect to property is progressive or
regressive. Givings, especially in kind, often go unnoticed, despite their
obvious redistributive effects. This, in turn, makes it impossible for
constituents to evaluate government performance in this area. Although
much public and scholarly attention has been given to the distributional
effects of tax policies, taxation is by no means the only instrument of
wealth distribution. In fact, focusing on tax alone will create a skewed view
of the real effect of government policies, if other forms of givings are
ignored. Accounting for all types of givings, as well as takings, is the only
way of attaining an accurate view of the net distributional effect of
government policies.
194. See, e.g., Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1981) (mentioning
“ the unspoken premise that government agencies have a tendency to swell, not shrink, and are
likely to have an expansive view of their mission” ); ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY
(1967); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 5-12
(1971); AARON WILDAVSKY , THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed. 1984);
William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618 (1975)
(constructing a model of bureaucratic supply on the “ assumption that the bureau acts to maximize
its budget” ). But see Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 436 (1991) (reporting that the theory of agency or
bureaucratic capture “ has not seemed to be theoretically or empirically fertile to many
sociologists and political scientists working in the regulation literature” ); David B. Spence &
Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 121-22 (2000)
(arguing that “ agency capture is no longer regarded as a valid descriptive theory of bureaucratic
behavior” ).
195. Levinson, supra note 23, at 380-82.
196. See infra Section IV.C.
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IV. IDENTIFYING AND CHARGING FOR GIVINGS
In this Part, we turn to the task of crafting a possible model of givings.
Having established the importance of accounting for givings, we craft a
model for creating a law of givings and for incorporating givings into
takings jurisprudence. Our model addresses the three essential elements of
the law of givings: identifying a giving, creating a mechanism for assessing
charges for the givings, and deciding when and how such charges should be
assessed.197
The central aim of this Part is to establish what a giving is, when the
government must assess a charge for a giving, and how that charge must be
collected. By a “ charge”  we mean a payment by the recipient, or
beneficiary of a giving,198 in exchange for the benefit received. The concept
of charge is the equivalent of compensation in the context of takings. The
magnitude of the charge, like the magnitude of compensation, reflects the
value of the transferred property interest,199 but moves in the opposite
direction. That is, in givings, as in takings, one side receives a property
interest, and the other side receives a payment, i.e., the charge or the
compensation award.
As we discuss, not every conferment of a benefit gives rise to a givings
charge, just as not every deprivation of a property right calls for
compensation. We call the granting of a benefit a “ chargeable giving”
when the giving must be accompanied by the assessment of a charge. This
parallels the accepted terminology of a “ compensable taking.”
Rather than adopt an artificially uniform system for charging all
givings, we divide the universe of givings according to four conceptual
clusters. Each cluster is organized around a characteristic feature of givings
and embodies a rule for treating the giving. Our list of conceptual clusters is
not exhaustive, but it highlights some central features of a givings
jurisprudence.
Methodologically, we frame our four clusters around their primary
characteristics. Our first cluster is organized around the symmetry between
givings and takings. The second looks to the number and character of
beneficiaries of the giving. The third examines the relationship between the
197. At the outset, we must acknowledge the important groundwork laid by Donald Hagman
and Dean Misczynski’s collection WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, which explored the
possibility of establishing a system of compensation for takings (including regulatory takings) to
be funded by revenues raised from taxing or collecting fees from givings recipients. Wi dfalls for
Wipeouts notes many historical schemes related to givings charges in the United States and other
countries, and we incorporate those insights into our recommendations in this Part, and, later, in
our discussion of alternatives to charges for givings in Part V.
198. We use the terms “ recipient”  and “ beneficiary”  interchangeably.
199. Valuation of the measure of compensation might be accomplished by a number of
different metrics, such as market value or willingness to sell. We discuss valuation questions in
Part V. A fuller analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
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givings and attendant takings. Finally, the fourth focuses on the ability of
the beneficiary to refuse the giving.
A. A Giving or a Taking: Reversibility of the Act
Eliminating all possibility of government distribution of benefits or
subsidies would mean a radical change in our conception of the role of the
state in creating and distributing wealth. That is not our aim. Therefore, a
central goal of a workable givings jurisprudence must be to distinguish
between chargeable givings and nonchargeable distribution of benefits—in
other words, to distinguish “ between intentional redistribution [on the one
hand] and the imposition of gains and losses as an incidental, and
sometimes unavoidable, side-effect of government action [on the other].”200
We propose that this line dividing chargeable givings from
nonchargeable distributions should mirror the line between compensable
takings and noncompensable deprivations of property. Unfortunately, the
line between compensable takings and noncompensable deprivations of
property is notoriously fuzzy,201 and the same fuzziness will blur the line
between a nonchargeable subsidy and a chargeable giving. Notwithstanding
this fuzziness, a formidable body of case law and scholarship has developed
around the identification of compensable takings, and this knowledge can
be put to use in identifying chargeable givings. The manner of doing so is a
straightforward principle: A giving is chargeable if its inverse would
constitute a compensable taking.
We develop this principle by examining several possible types of
property grants that, when reversed, produce noncompensable deprivations
of property. The first of these types is a prize. A prize is properly seen as
the reverse of a penalty. It is the award of a government benefit in response
to socially beneficial activity.202 Instances of government prizes include
grants for the study of disease or merit scholarships for university study.
Government versions of such private sector prizes as Nobel Prizes and
Pulitzer Prizes would similarly fall in this category. A prize’s inverse
analogue is the penalty, imposed upon socially harmful activity.203 Just as
200. Kaplow, supra note 3, at 519.
201. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
202. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 62 (1992) (suggesting
that prizes are cultural means of solving public-good market failures).
203. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 73-84
(1983); POSNER, supra note 27, at 220-22; Gary S. Becker, C ime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170-80 (1968); Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation
of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1466-68
(1979); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652,
655 (1983); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 (1979); George J. Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
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the penalty is not considered a compensable taking,204 the prize should not
be seen as a chargeable giving. When the government rewards socially
beneficial activity, no charge should be assessed. The reason for this
treatment is two-fold. First, to require the payment of a charge for a prize
would defeat the purpose of the government action. The prize is granted in
order to lead actors to internalize positive externalities caused by their
actions. Payment of a charge would eliminate the incentive and social
benefit produced by the prize. Second, the granting of a prize to produce
widespread social benefits transforms the nature of the government benefit
from a giving to an individual to a benefit to society at large. As we discuss
in the next Section, benefits to the wider public generally should not be
considered chargeable givings.205 Both of these rationales assume that the
prize is proportionate to the social benefit. Where prizes are grossly
excessive, the excessive portion should be treated as a chargeable giving,
just as grossly excessive penalties are not validly treated as penalties.206
The prize exception is intended to be a narrow one. One possible way
to safeguard against wrapping givings in the clothing of prizes is to
examine whether the criteria for granting the prize were established ex ante
or ex post. Another is to check whether the criteria for awarding the prize
are of general applicability or, rather, whether they are specifically tailored
to suit a particular beneficiary. Finally, the magnitude of the prize may be
examined in relation to the purported social benefit it is intended to reward.
Another type of nonchargeable giving can be derived by analogy to
taxes. Just as some direct seizures can be seen as taxes rather than
compensable takings, some direct grants should be seen as nonchargeable.
Consistent with the power of the government to tax for purposes of
redistribution, we do not look askance at large scale and nontargeted
conferment of benefits for redistribution. Specifically, we do not believe
that the goal of takings and givings law is to eliminate welfare programs
and similar government redistributions of wealth.207
204. The distinction between a taking and a penalty has been recognized since the days of
Grotius. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. II, ch. XIV, § VII, at 385 (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625).
205. See infra Section IV.B.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that a large civil
forfeiture may constitute an excessive fine); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (same).
In our system the treatment of penalties and prizes is not entirely symmetrical, in that excessive
prizes are not completely barred, but are charged in the amount of the excess. We discuss later the
reason for assessing charges, rather than outlawing excessive givings. See infra Section VI.D.
207. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 3.
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B. One or Many: Identifiability of the Recipient
The distinction between taxes and takings provides guidance for
another givings principle. Saul Levmore has noted that a useful way to
determine when takings require compensation is to examine the number of
people affected by the government action. On Levmore’s view, when the
government singles out condemnees, compensation is presumptively
required. However, a broad taking from the public at large should not
require compensation.208 By the same token, we posit that a giving to a
single beneficiary should presumptively give rise to a charge. When, by
contrast, the government action affects the broader public, there is more
reason to view it as a tax or a noncompensable regulation.209 Likewise,
when the government action benefits the public at large, the need for
assessing a charge is presumptively weaker.210
An important caveat is in order here, however. One must bear in mind
that tax burdens may not be distributed uniformly over the relevant group
members; some members may be disproportionately burdened relative to
others.211 The same may be true of givings. Even when a giving benefits the
broad public, the benefit to some members may far exceed the benefit to
others.212 Public choice theory suggests that those standing to benefit
disproportionately from the giving have a strong motivation to engage in
political rent-seeking in order to ensure that the giving is effected.213 Thus,
in addition to examining whether a giving affects one or many, it is also
necessary to examine how the benefits of a giving are distributed over the
group of beneficiaries. If the distribution is uniform, no charge should be
assessed. As the distribution becomes increasingly skewed, however, there
is greater reason to view the giving as singling out particular beneficiaries,
and consequently, the prima facie case for assessing a charge becomes
stronger. Finally, it is also important to consider the randomness of the
208. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1348 (“Compensation for a governmental intervention will be
required when a politically unprotected loser is singled out and when there is a close substitute in the
form of a private purchase.” ); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 315 (noting that
“ few have systematically explored the idea that when the burden of a government action falls on a
sufficiently broad public in roughly equal proportions, the action is better characterized as a tax
than as a taking” ).
209. See Levmore, supra note 66, at 1348.
210. Obviously, many actions lie on the continuum between the paradigmatic giving to a
single individual and a giving to the public at large. We discuss these cases after examining the
two extreme scenarios of singling out and benefiting the public at large.
211. Sometimes, the relative equality will have to be equal treatment with regard to economic
circumstances rather than equal per capita treatment. An example of such treatment is provided by
the progressive income tax. The givings analogue is welfare payments to the indigent.
212. The Yazoo land frauds provide an apt example of this. See supra notes 135-136 and
accompanying text.
213. Cf. Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998) (calling for a reinterpretation of
the Takings Clause to reduce private rent-seeking).
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distribution of benefits. As the benefits are more randomly distributed, the
likelihood of improper interest-group capture is correspondingly less.
The singling-out principle is the core of Levmore’s distinction between
the compensable and the noncompensable. Levmore’s primary justification
for the singling-out principle lies in the realm of public choice theory. The
principle, however, can be justified as well on grounds of fairness. We
begin with fairness before proceeding to Levmore’s justification.
As the famous formulation in Armstrong v. United States put it, the
essential fairness principle embodied in the Takings Clause is that one
person should not be forced “ to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”214 It is evident,
therefore, that when the burden is borne by the public as a whole, this
fairness criterion has not been violated. While the Armstrong rule tells us
neither when the public as a whole ought to bear the burden nor when the
burden has fallen on the public as a whole, Armstrong’s fairness criterion
clearly militates against singling people out. As we explained earlier,215 the
Armstrong fairness principle applies with equal force to givings. It would
be unfair for an individual to enjoy a benefit at society’s expense, when the
benefit should, in all fairness and justice, be enjoyed by society as a whole.
It is only when the state bestows an identical benefit on every member of
the public, and when we assume that the state is a proxy of the entire
public, that we can characterize the giving as nothing more than a transfer
from the public to itself. It would be wasteful under such circumstances for
the public to charge itself for the giving.
This result is underscored by a public choice analysis. From a public
choice perspective, politics is driven by rent-seeking.216 When the public as
a whole is the beneficiary of a giving in equal parts, it is insensible to speak
of rent-seeking. However, absent such parity in the distribution of benefits,
political decisions may be attributed to factional rent-seeking.
Minoritarian interest-group rent-seeking is well-documented. Poletown,
as we have shown, is best understood as a giving to General Motors at the
expense of the public. Givings to private sports franchises, politically
connected real estate developers, and gambling interests217 provide other
commonplace examples of givings prompted by minoritarian rent-seeking.
These groups share an organizational and financial ability to influence the
political process to their benefit. Acting as self-interested utility
maximizers, such groups are able to outmaneuver diffuse political
214. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); supra Section III.A.
215. Supra Section III.A.
216. To provide a complete picture, there is also a third possibility of rent-seeking: rent-
seeking by bureaucrats. We seek to curb this type of rent-seeking by matching givings with
takings. See infra Section IV.C.
217. See Kochan, supra note 213, at 76-78.
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opponents whose ability to take advantage of their larger numbers is
hampered by high coordination costs. Naturally, minoritarian rent-seeking
leads to the enrichment of the better organized groups at the expense of the
larger public. Forcing interest groups to pay a fair charge for the benefits
they receive is an effective way to curb minoritarian rent-seeking. Doing so
will not only benefit the public financially, but will also improve the
political decisionmaking process in the long run. Moreover, forcing interest
groups to pay will diminish their incentive to influence political processes,
which will reduce in turn the deadweight loss stemming from political
lobbying and counter-lobbying.218
Obviously, factional rent-seeking may be majoritarian as well. Less
glamorous land-use decisions, such as ordinary suburban zoning, are less
likely to fall prey to minoritarian rent-seeking, but are far more likely to
attract majoritarian rent-seeking.219 Although in such cases singling out of
givings beneficiaries is rare, the giving is likely to be accompanied by the
singling out of the victims of takings. Consider, for example, Kinzli v. City
of Santa Cruz.220 Kinzli owned an undeveloped tract of land in a rapidly
developing suburb. After neighboring landowners profited from the
development, they adopted a “greenbelt”  plan, barring further development
and preventing Kinzli from developing his land. The result can be
characterized as the singling out of Kinzli for a regulatory taking in order to
grant derivative givings to a majority faction of landowners who had already
profited from previous development. The ability of suburban majorities to
abuse the zoning process to extract rents for majority factions has been
widely noted, especially in the context of exclusionary zoning.221 In these
cases, as we note later, the best remedy is to be found in takings
compensation, rather than givings charges.222 For example, in Kinzli,
assuming that the environmental plan conferred roughly equal benefits to all
homeowners, there would be no need to assess charges against all givings
recipients since the larger public benefited from the derivative givings in the
form of the “greenbelt.”  However, as the taking did not fall on the larger
public, payment of compensation would be warranted under the singling-out
principle. Since takings compensation comes out of the public fisc, the
218. See, e.g., Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 295-96 (1974) (analyzing the efficiency effects of political lobbying); Richard
A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 809 (1975)
(same).
219. See FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 233.
220. 620 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir.),
amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987).
221. E.g., FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 233; CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE
(1996); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 695 (1973).
222. See infra Section IV.C.
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recipients of the benefit indirectly sponsor the compensation to the singled-
out property owner.
An important caveat should be inserted at this point. If the majoritarian
rents are of such a nature that the majority may exclude the minority from
participation in the benefits of givings, the givings should no longer be
immune from charge. For example, if Kinzli involved a mechanism for
excluding Kinzli himself from enjoyment of the greenbelt, charges for the
givings would be necessary alongside compensation for the taking.223 Such
cases are rare, but certainly within the realm of possibility. For example, a
majority may allow itself expansive building rights, while denying similar
rights to a minority of homeowners in order to preserve scenic views or
other benefits that would accrue only to the majority.
Our analysis implies the following general principle. Considerations of
fairness and minoritarian rent-seeking mandate assessment of charges for
givings to individuals or to discrete interest groups. We emphasize that we
exclude from this general principle givings to discrete minority groups that
purport to compensate such groups for past wrongs. In such cases, the
giving should properly be viewed as compensation for past takings or
deprivations and should not be classified as a benefit.
C. Give and Take: Proximity of the Act to a Taking
In this Section, we turn to the relationship between givings and takings
for further guidance in determining whether and how to assess charges for
givings. Both of our previously enunciated principles—givings that cannot
be characterized as inverse takings should not give rise to charges, nor
should widely and equally distributed givings—involve questions of takings
as well as of givings. This is hardly surprising in light of the intimate
connection between givings and takings. As we have shown, the connection
between takings and givings extends beyond theory; takings cases almost
invariably involve givings as well. We now show that the relationship
between givings and takings can be specifically adapted to the question of
when and how to assess charges for givings. We note that this relationship
also played a key role in Hagman and Misczynski’s “ windfalls for
wipeouts”  proposals.224
Indeed, even though current takings jurisprudence does not explicitly
recognize the concept of givings, it looks to the relationship between
givings and takings for an important guideline in determining eligibility for
223. See supra Section III.C.
224. Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski, Recommendations, in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at 26, 31.
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compensation.225 For instance, the average reciprocity of advantage
doctrine, enunciated by Justice Holmes in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.226
and Mahon,227 establishes that no takings compensation is warranted where
the government action works an average reciprocity of advantage, i.e., it
creates diffuse public benefits to all, including the owner whose property is
taken.228 The underlying logic is that both the wealth-enhancing (giving)
and wealth-diminishing (taking) elements of government action must be
taken into account in determining compensation. Following the same logic,
we argue that in determining the amount of compensation to be paid or
charge to be assessed, the total value of givings and takings must be taken
into account. Takings compensation must be reduced by the value of
attendant givings received by an owner, and givings charges must be
reduced by the value of attendant takings. Moreover, in some cases, when
givings can be specifically tied to takings, it may be appropriate to channel
both into a scheme of private takings, such as the one described in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.229
The relationship between takings and givings suggests two principles
for determining charges. First, it implies consideration of the overall effect
of government actions, i.e., both harms and benefits. Second, it implies that
when compensable takings are associated with chargeable givings, the
recipients of the giving should compensate the victims of the taking.
A natural starting point for our discussion is the benefit-offset principle
of the nineteenth century. Under this principle, the government (or private
agents empowered to take by eminent domain) would reduce compensation
paid for takings by the value of the benefits that accrued to the aggrieved
homeowner as a consequence of the government action.230 For example,
when a railroad laid track through farmland, the value of all surrounding
farmland would rise. Using delegated powers to take through eminent
domain and applying the benefit-offset principle, railroads would take
farmland in order to lay track and then reduce the amount of compensation
by the value of the benefit to the owner’s remaining farmland.231
The benefit-offset principle was a more sophisticated version of today’s
average reciprocity of advantage doctrine, incorporating several elements
225. See generally supra Section II.C (documenting the relationship between givings and
takings).
226. 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922).
227. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For a historical review of the concept, see Oswald, supra note
89, at 1490-510.
228. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
229. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
230. The benefit-offset principle allowed the government to reduce the compensation to
property owners claiming a taking by the amount of the benefit that the taking conferred on the
owners’ remaining property. Supra note 37. For a discussion of the benefit-offset principle, see
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 80-84.
231. Id. at 80-89.
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lost in the later doctrine. First, while not using the term givings, the benefit-
offset principle aggregated the total value of the derivative giving and
physical taking in order to determine the amount of compensation. By
contrast, the average reciprocity of advantage doctrine is binary. It
determines either that there is a rough reciprocity, negating the finding of a
regulatory taking and eliminating the need for compensation, or that there is
no such reciprocity, whereupon compensation will be based solely on the
value of the taking, while the giving is ignored.232 Second, the average
reciprocity of advantage doctrine is only understood to apply to regulatory
takings and not to physical takings (or derivative takings).233 The benefit-
offset principle, on the other hand, was applied specifically to physical
takings.234
Despite its relative advantages, the benefit-offset principle remained
clumsy and inadequate. First, the principle served only to reduce
compensation for takings. Thus, property owners who received givings in
excess of the value of the taking, or from whom no property was taken at
all, paid no charge.235 Second, the principle left open the possibility of other
unaccounted-for givings and takings effects, such as the adverse effects of
derivative takings.236 In the particular setting in which the benefit-offset
principle was applied, unaccounted-for givings posed the more daunting
problem. The railroads, for whose benefit the property was taken, increased
the property values of all surrounding farmland. Applying the benefit-offset
principle to takings compensation, while ignoring the derivative givings
bestowed upon all neighboring owners whose land was not physically
affected, led to an odd outcome. A charge was assessed only on property
owners who suffered the brunt of the government actions: those whose land
was actually seized. All others received the giving free of charge.237
232. See Coletta, supra note 38, at 321.
233. Id. at 356.
234. As Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), had not yet recognized
regulatory takings, it is not surprising that the benefit-offset principle was not applied in that
context.
235. See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 85-89.
236. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 290 n.52 (discussing the distortion arising
from failure to take into account full costs and benefits).
237. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 82-83; supra Subsection II.C.2. Other commentators criticized
the benefit-offset principle on the ground that it unfairly subsidized railroads. See, e.g., Scheiber,
supra note 37, at 364-68. This would have been true only if there were other uncompensated
takings that outweighed the uncharged givings, or if the actual values of the givings and takings
were measured inaccurately. Although the former explanation is belied by the historical evidence,
the latter is a real possibility. The accurate measurement of values enhanced or diminished by
givings or takings is of obvious importance for the proper functioning of the law. See FISCHEL,
supra note 1, at 80-89. Issues of the adequacy of the yardsticks for measuring takings (and, by
implication, givings) are beyond the scope of this Article. S e infra Section V.B.
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The benefit-offset principle’s shortcomings ultimately doomed it,
despite its periodic resurfacing.238 Nevertheless, an updated benefit-offset
principle is an important asset of any proper application of a law of givings.
The intuition underlying the benefit-offset principle is correct: Any
payment in compensation for a taking must be reduced by the value of the
giving to the property owner.239
A complementary detriment-offset principle must be used in the law of
givings. Any charge for a giving must be reduced by the absolute value of
the taking to the property owner. Nevertheless, care must be taken to avoid
the one-dimensionality that undid the benefit-offset principle. Assessing
charges for all givings to all property owners would undo the core
unfairness of the nineteenth-century version of the benefit-offset principle.
Additionally, the updated principle must take into account all three types of
givings and all three types of takings in order to lead to just and efficient
results.
Unified treatment of givings and takings need not be restricted to cases
where the giving beneficiary and taking victim are the same person.
Sometimes the takings and givings are intimately linked, and the givings
recipients sufficiently well-identified and discrete, such that takings
compensation and givings charges can best be taken care of by having
beneficiaries make payment directly to victims. Poletown240 provides a
particularly salient example. The obvious beneficiary of the physical giving
was General Motors; the victims of the physical takings were numerous
homeowners in Poletown. Direct compensation from General Motors to the
homeowners would have eliminated an unnecessary public subsidy to the
auto company and might have led General Motors to reevaluate whether the
Poletown facility was cost-effective.
Indeed, the proper course in cases such as Poletown is to aggregate the
givings and takings and reinterpret the total government action as a
government-mediated private taking. In a private taking, the government
empowers a private individual or organization, such as a utility company, to
take property by using the government’s power of eminent domain, while
238. E.g., Bookman v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 41 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1895); Bohm v. Metro.
Elevated Ry., 29 N.E. 802 (N.Y. 1892); Newman v. Metro. Elevated Ry., 23 N.E. 901 (N.Y.
1890); see also Charles M. Haar & Barbara Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land
Acquisition, 51 CAL. L. REV. 833 (1963) (discussing the use of benefit-offset to finance highway
construction).
239. We assume here that the taking and giving are properly aggregated into a single
transaction. Daryl Levinson argues that the boundaries of “ transactions”  are difficult to identify
and that a course of interactions between individuals and the government that takes place over an
extended period of time ought nevertheless to be viewed as a single transaction in many contexts.
Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2002).
240. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
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remaining subject to the requirement of just compensation.241 While the
notion of private takings may sound exotic or corporatist, the technique is
widespread, and past examples of private takings fall on various points
along the political spectrum. For example, Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff242 involved a Hawaii statute that achieved land reform by allowing
tenant farmers privately to take land from large landowners. Private takings
by railroads were commonly permitted in the nineteenth century.243 As long
as all the relevant givings and takings are accounted for, the private taking
should create significant savings in transaction costs by substantially
reducing the largely unnecessary intermediary role of the government.
The rendering of compensation by givings recipients to takings victims
in cases of government-mediated private takings is mandated not only by
efficiency principles but also by the demands of corrective justice.244
Corrective justice requires that individuals who wrong others compensate
the victims for their losses.245 Wrongs consist of actions that harm or invade
individual rights or the legitimate interests of others.246 When individuals or
corporations enlist government power to transfer property from other
owners to themselves, they should be held responsible for the losses they
inflict. The involvement of the government should not blind one to the
underlying quasi-tortious situation—the taking of one’s private property by
another. The private taking power should not be granted lightly. This power
has its drawbacks. A private taking power is a potent tool that transforms
property-rule protection into liability-rule protection.247 It should only be
241. A private taking, also known as a private condemnation, is “ the taking of private
property by a private individual for a public use.”  Kent M. Brown, Casenote, Cohen v. Larson:
The Idaho Constitution and the Right of Eminent Domain, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 623, 624 (1995);
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
242. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
243. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 80-89.
244. While there is no single universally accepted definition of corrective justice, in a recent
article, Gregory Keating characterized it as follows: “ First, it applies to human agency, not, say,
to natural misfortunes. Second, it is concerned with repair or rectification. Third, it is concerned
with rectifying some kind of wrongdoing—with ‘wrongful losses’ in Coleman’s case. Fourth, it
involves correlativity.”  Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law
of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 197 (2000) (citing Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of
Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 66-67 (David G. Owen
ed., 1995)). Given this list, it is not surprising that tort law has captured the attention of corrective
justice theorists. Notable accounts grounding tort law in principles of corrective justice include
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-28 (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY ,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 24 (1999); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-
83 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); and
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Torts Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). For a
critical review of the attempts to base tort law on corrective justice, see Benjamin Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
245. COLEMAN, supra note 244, at 332 (“ Corrective justice imposes the duty to repair
wrongful losses.” ).
246. Id. ( “ Wrongs are actions contrary to rights.” ).
247. Property-rule protection confers upon the entitlement-holder the exclusive power to
determine the price nonholders would have to pay for using the protected asset or right. Thus, all
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used to promote important societal goals, and not to redistribute wealth
from one individual to another.
The relationship between givings and takings thus produces two distinct
principles of importance for an understanding of givings. First, payment of
compensation for a taking, or assessment of a charge for a giving, should
reflect the net effect of all givings and takings befalling the property owner.
Compensation, if any, should reflect the net property loss occasioned by the
aggregated takings offset by the aggregated givings. Charges, by the same
token, must incorporate the net value of the benefit to the property, after the
aggregated givings are offset by the aggregated takings. Second, where
linkage between the giving and taking is sufficiently clear, the number of
givings beneficiaries and takings victims is sufficiently small, and the
givings and takings sufficiently measurable, compensation and charge
should be made directly between the parties to the extent feasible. In some
cases, this may take the form of direct authorization of a private taking.
D. Take It or Leave It: Refusability of the Benefit
Our fourth, and final, conceptual cluster is organized around a principle
we extract from the law of gifts and unjust enrichment. Both bodies of law
require voluntary acceptance by the recipient of the benefit.248 The rationale
for this requirement is straightforward. The law does not force people to
accept benefits against their will. The underlying goal of the voluntary
acceptance requirement is to prevent forced transactions in which professed
“ benefactors”  involuntarily impose “ benefits”  on others and later demand
the recipients pay. Forcible extraction of a payment in exchange for an
involuntary “ gift”  may carry the odor of extortion.249
transfers of entitlements protected by a property rule must be consensual; all attempts to transfer
the entitlement nonconsensually would be met with an injunction. Liability rule protection, by
contrast, gives the nonholder the power to take the entitlement without the consent of the
entitlement-holder and pay a price to be determined by a third party, typically a court or the
legislature. The entitlement-holder would not be able to enjoin third parties from taking her
entitlement; instead, she would have to settle for damages. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
248. Paul Wangerin argues:
Defendants who are the recipients of gifts, for example, clearly are enriched. However,
that enrichment is clearly not unjust. . . . The same thing is true regarding “ volunteers.”
If a person voluntarily provides something to another, the other may well be enriched.
But, because of the voluntariness, the enrichment is not unjust.
Paul T. Wangerin, The Strategic Value of Restitutionary Remedies, 75 NEB. L. REV. 255, 272
(1996).
249. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 202 (1992) (“ Because restitution defendants are usually passive
rather than active recipients of others’ actions, courts are reluctant to impose liability upon
them. . . . [T]he very paradigm of corrective justice is best described as a relationship between
‘doer’ and ‘sufferer.’ Imposing liability on a nondoer requires special justification.” ).
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Suspicion about the propriety of forced transfers is grounded in
foundational assumptions about morality and efficiency. Primary among
these is the belief in the moral autonomy of individuals, and confidence in
their right and ability to make decisions that promote their own interests.250
When a would-be beneficiary refuses to accept a transaction that the
“ benefactor”  deems to be in the beneficiary’s best interests, respect for the
beneficiary’s autonomy and decisionmaking capacity dictates deference to
her decision.
The framework of put and call options provides a useful lens through
which to see the relationship between givings and takings and the
importance of voluntary acceptance.251 A call option creates the power to
purchase an asset from a specific seller at a later time; a put option is an
option to force a sale in the future. The call or put eliminates the need for
future acceptance by the call seller or the put buyer. Instead, the call seller
or put buyer grants her acceptance upon creation of the option, allowing the
“ caller”  (the call buyer) or the “ putter”  (the put seller) to make a future
offer with acceptance assured. The call or put option generally specifies an
“ exercise price,”  i.e., the price at which the option-holder can buy or sell
the underlying asset.252
Seen in this light, the power of eminent domain is a call option in the
hands of the government. All property is subject to the government power
to “ call,”  i.e., the power to force a sale to the government. The exercise
price to be paid by the government is “ just compensation”  (under current
doctrine, the objective market price of the property).253 The giving power, in
this framework, is equivalent to a put option. Remarkably, under current
law, which does not fully recognize the concept of givings, the exercise
price of the government’s put option is zero. That is, the government can
bestow valuable benefits, but the recipients are not required to pay for them.
Because the creation of government call and put options is by operation
of law, such options lack the consensual basis of commercial options.
Individual property owners have granted the government neither the power
to take, nor the power to give.254 The government must therefore exercise
these options with great caution. The reason to be even more cautious about
givings than about takings is grounded in notions of autonomy. In the
context of takings, the government may prefer its judgment to that of the
250. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 62-66, 93-95
(H.J. Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1948) (1785).
251. We are indebted to Ian Ayres for this insight.
252. See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998)
(discussing and evaluating protection of property rights with put and call options).
253. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,
J.).
254. Presumably, it is the polity of which the owners are a part that has empowered the
government to give and take.
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individual property owner since the government, subject to the discipline of
the Takings Clause, represents the interest of the public, whereas the
harmed property owner only considers her own interest.255 In the context of
givings, on the other hand, the intended beneficiary is the property owner
who receives the giving. The receiving property owner is thus the best
judge of whether the giving actually constitutes a benefit, and her right to
make her own decisions about her own welfare should be respected.
Implementing an acceptance requirement in the law of givings leads us
to the following rule: If a giving is refusable and the beneficiary accepts it,
she should pay the charge upon receipt. If, on the other hand, the giving is
not refusable, payment of the charge should be deferred until a future
realization event transpires.256 If the benefit is permanently refused and
realization never occurs, no charge should be assessed.
Consider the following example. The City of Gro decides to upzone
one of its neighborhoods by granting all the residents the possibility of
adding two extra floors to their houses. Harriet Height, who has been
waiting for years for the possibility of adding an upper floor to her low-
slung, ranch-style home, decides to avail herself of the giving immediately.
Her more cautious neighbor Lea Low has no need of the extra space and
has no desire to alter her dwelling. Under our proposed rule, Harriet will be
assessed a charge for the giving immediately, while Lea will not be
assessed any charge at present. However, should Lea or her successors in
interest decide to build in the future, they will have to pay a charge at that
time.
Sometimes, realization will be more difficult to determine. Imagine that
Gro now decides to convert a large landholding into a nature preserve,
raising the value of all neighboring property owners. Denise Dale, Elise
Evergreen, and Francine Forest are ecstatic about the new preserve, but
Geraldine Grouch dislikes the new greenery. In this case, the benefit is not
refusable. There is no way to grant the benefit to Dale, Elise, and Francine,
while preserving for Geraldine an option to refuse. The moment the benefit
is created, all affected neighbors receive a financial benefit; the benefit in
this case is nonexcludable. Once she is outvoted by the other residents,
Geraldine will have no power to reject the financial benefit created by the
new preserve. Our rule dictates that the charge for this nonrefusable benefit
be deferred until its value is actually realized—for example, by sale of the
property. Geraldine will enjoy the same financial benefits upon sale of the
property as her neighbors, and at that time, she should pay the same charge.
255. As we noted earlier, public choice theory disputes the Pigouvian view of government
and requires the discipline of the Takings Clause to prevent excess use of the power of eminent
domain. Supra Section III.C.
256. Realization is the conversion of property into money. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 102, at 1271.
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By the same token, since the giving is nonrefusable, Denise, Elise, and
Francine should not be punished for their external manifestation of support
for the nature preserve, and they too should be asked to pay only when they
realize the gain.257
This last example highlights a common aspect of takings and givings.
In both cases, an element of coercion is necessary to overcome potential
holdout problems.258 In the context of takings, property owners might hold
out in order to extract greater payment from the government. In the context
of givings, property owners might hold out to extract higher payments from
their neighbors. In our example, if Geraldine could refuse the giving, she
could abuse her refusal power to force her neighbors to pay for the benefit
she receives. It is to alleviate the risk of such strategic behavior that the
government is granted the extraordinary power to take and the power to
give.259
Our discussion may be summarized as follows. In principle, recipients
of givings should not be forced to pay a charge if they elect to refuse the
giving. If the giving is nonrefusable, all beneficiaries should be permitted to
defer payment of the charge until a later realization event, typically a sale of
the property.
V. PAYING FOR GIVINGS
In this Part, we translate the conceptual clusters of givings into a basic
working model for identifying, assessing, and collecting charges for
givings. Our central purpose here is illustrative. That is, we propose this
model in order to demonstrate how a law of givings can be formulated and
implemented. We do not foreclose the possibility of other models of
administering the law of givings.
Our model uses our conceptual clusters to craft the three central pillars
of the law of givings: identification, assessment, and collection. At the
identification stage, the government recognizes that a chargeable giving has
taken place, and it issues a notice of giving to the beneficiary. In the
assessment stage, the beneficiary assesses the value of the giving for the
purpose of paying the charge. In our model, assessment can take place
immediately upon receipt of the notice of giving, or at some later time when
the charge is collected. In the third and last stage, collection, the
government collects the charge for the giving in accordance with the
257. Our rule would function in a manner not dissimilar to realization rules for taxes of
capital gains. See Comm’r v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
258. For a discussion of the holdout problem in the context of takings, see Carol M. Rose,
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 711, 749-61 (1986).
259. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 164-66.
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giving’s assessed value. Depending on the character of the giving,
collection is either made upon receipt of the benefit or triggered by a
realization event, such as sale of the benefited property.
A. Identifying Chargeable Givings
The first stage in the givings process, after a government decision to
confer a benefit, is the determination of whether a chargeable giving has
occurred. Answering this question requires using the first two of the four
conceptual clusters presented in the previous Part. For a giving to be
chargeable, the character of the government act—its singling out of
beneficiaries260 or, more generally, its character as an inverse taking261—
must properly be seen as a chargeable giving. Unfortunately, the
determination relies upon judgments of degree, like decisions about
whether deprivations of property constitute compensable takings.
Once the government determines that the conferment of a benefit is a
chargeable giving, it should give notice to all beneficiaries that they have
received a giving and that it is chargeable. In the notice of giving, the
government should also state whether the charge for the giving is
immediately payable or is deferred until a later realization. Obviously, the
timing of the assessment affects the magnitude of the charge. An upzoning,
on its own, does not entitle property owners to start building. There are
numerous other obstacles property owners must clear before they receive a
building permit. Thus, an assessment that follows immediately after a
zoning change will invariably be lower than one submitted following
realization, reflecting discounting due to uncertainty. The decision whether
to charge immediately or defer charge until realization must be made in
accordance with the process we describe in our discussion of the collection
stage.262
B. Assessing Givings
There are two possible models of assessing givings. The first, and
perhaps more conventional one, places the burden of assessing givings on
the government. The second, utilizing various methods of self-assessment,
places the burden on givings recipients.
The key to the assessment process is to determine the market value of
the benefit bestowed. For example, in the case of a physical giving, the
charge should be the sale price of the property given or similar property.
260. See supra Section IV.B.
261. See supra Section IV.A.
262. See infra Section V.C.
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With respect to regulatory or derivative givings, standard methods of
property appraisal should be employed to determine the amount due.
Complications set in where there is a significant divergence between
the market value and one or both of the subjective government or
beneficiary values. In such cases, the general rule should be that the person
choosing to carry out the transaction should pay the full subjective value of
the property in the hands of the nonchooser. Thus, for a taking or a giving,
the general rule would prescribe government compensation or charge of the
full subjective value of the property in the hands of the citizen losing or
receiving the property. The rationale is that since the nonchooser has no
choice in the matter, the chooser should have to internalize the full value to
the nonchooser in order to ensure that the transaction is worthwhile. In a
recent article, however, Ian Ayres and Paul Goldbart argued that where the
recipient has an option to refuse the benefit the general rule should no
longer apply. This is due to the fact that setting the charge at the full
subjective value of the nonchooser would eliminate the incentive of the
nonchooser to accept the taking or giving. Rather, the optimal exercise
price is obtained at a price somewhere between the value to the chooser and
the value to the nonchooser.263 According to Ayres and Goldbart’s analysis,
then, the charge assessed for a giving should be the average of its value to
the government and to the recipient, unless the giving is nonrefusable. For
nonrefusable givings, Ayres and Goldbart would assess a charge of the full
value to the recipient.
Under the model of government assessment, the government would
inform givings recipients that a giving has occurred by sending them a
notice of giving. The notice would also specify the amount due from each
recipient. The government can assess the charge at one of two times—either
within a reasonable period of time after sending a notice (for example, until
the next income tax filing deadline) or, if realization of the giving is
deferred to a later date, at that time. The advantage of imposing assessment
responsibility on the government is that in many cases government
assessment will reduce the administrative cost of charging for givings
because the same assessment applies to multiple recipients. Rather than
forcing 100 recipients of an upzoning to obtain their own appraisal of the
market value of the benefit received, the government can appraise the
benefit and inform all recipients of the amount due.264 Moreover, because
the government employs appraisers for tax and other purposes, it may be
able to obtain appraisal at a lower cost. The assessment of local government
263. Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of
Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (discussing the possibility of “ dual
chooser rules,”  which allow either party to a transaction to veto the transfer of an entitlement).
264. Of course, the government can spread the cost of obtaining the appraisal over the group
of beneficiaries.
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assessors may serve as the benchmark for charges. Admittedly, these
assessments are not fully accurate.265 Yet, they already form the basis for
tax liability. Furthermore, assuming that the ratio of underassessments to
overassessments is roughly equal—and we have no reason to assume
otherwise—on average, the two effects will cancel out, and the government
will collect the amount due.
Government assessment is not the only possibility. The market value of
the giving need not necessarily be determined by the government; it may
also be determined by the recipient of the giving through self-assessment.
Under the model of recipient assessment, the notice of giving will only
announce that a giving has occurred, whereupon the duty to assess the
magnitude of the giving passes to the giving beneficiary. As was the case
with government assessment, giving beneficiaries will have the option of
making the assessment within a reasonable time from the receipt of the
notice of giving, or making it at the time of realization of the giving when
realization of the giving is deferred.
Of course, self-assessment may give rise to a problem of
underreporting. Left to their own devices, property owners may understate
the benefits they receive from state action. To counter the proclivity of the
assessors to exaggerate in their own favor by understating the magnitude of
their benefits, the state must employ a mechanism of random audits and
penalties of sufficient magnitude to deter false reporting. We propose a self-
assessment mechanism similar to that which we described in our proposal
for valuing derivative takings,266 modeled in part on the income tax
enforcement apparatus,267 meeting the need for low cost and accuracy.
Another option is the self-assessment model proposed by Saul
Levmore.268 Levmore pointed out that the incentive of property owners to
underreport may be countered by making the assessed value serve not only
as the basis for property tax liability but also as a call price. In Levmore’s
system, third parties could periodically “ call”  the property, forcing a sale at
the self-assessed price. Under this system of forced sales, an underreporting
property owner exposes herself to the risk of her property being purchased
at a lower-than-market price. Thus, underreporting is a self-defeating
strategy.
265. For a discussion of the assessment system and its drawbacks, see Saul Levmore, Self-
Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 771-75 (1982).
266. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 300-04.
267. See generally JAMES J. FREEDLAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION  962-85 (11th ed. 2000) (surveying the self-assessment, auditing, and penalty
procedures in the federal income tax apparatus); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 818 (1998) (citing various studies relevant to the income tax enforcement
apparatus).
268. Levmore, supra note 265, at 779.
PARCHFINAL.DOC NOVEMBER 28, 2001  11/28/01 5:51 PM
608 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 111: 547
Finally, Hagman and Misczynski have put forward the interesting
proposal of allowing owners to propose in advance a single number for
property value that would serve as the basis for calculations of both givings
and takings. This approach has the advantage of deterring over- or under-
stating property value, since the figure could serve as the basis of either
compensation or charge. However, in order for such deterrence to be
effective, the probable effects of over- and under-reporting (taking into
account the likelihood of givings and takings and the value of each) would
have to be roughly equivalent.269
C. Collecting Charges for Givings
The last stage of the givings process is the collection stage, in which
givings beneficiaries pay the giving charge. If the giving is refusable, the
charge should be paid within a reasonable time (perhaps a year) of receipt
of the benefit. Otherwise, payment of the charge should be deferred until a
realization event. Whether payment of the charge is immediate or deferred,
givings should be treated together with other associated givings and
takings, and the relevant charges and compensations should be offset. An
individual who suffers a taking together with a giving should receive, or
pay, in accordance with the aggregate value of the government action. If the
number of givings beneficiaries is sufficiently small, the givings
beneficiaries should make payment directly to takings victims, or the
government action should be turned into a private taking.
The collection stage may thus be summarized by the following table:
TABLE 5. COLLECTION STAGE OF A GIVING CHARGE
Linked to Taking Unlinked to Taking
Refusable
Offset taking and pay
remainder of charge, if any Pay charge
Nonrefusable
Offset taking and defer
remainder of charge, if any Defer charge
Where charges are deferred, payment should be made only when the
giving benefit is realized. The realization event may be the sale of the
affected property or any other event deemed appropriate.
269. Hagman & Misczynski, supra note 224, at 31, 52.
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VI. DEALING WITH MISGIVINGS
So far, we have demonstrated the need for a law of givings and
sketched out its necessary components. We proposed a foundation for a
givings jurisprudence, and we have offered a possible model for identifying
chargeable givings and assessing and collecting charges. In this Part, we
consider potential objections to our framework. Most importantly, we
discuss programs—such as exactions, special assessments, and impact
fees—that are associated with the core concerns of the law of givings. We
also address a host of other objections having to do with the practicality of a
law of givings and defining its outer boundaries.
A. Exactions, Special Assessments, Fees, and Taxes
The first objection that we address is the argument that specialized
development fees such as exactions and special assessments adequately
address the challenge of givings.270 An exaction is a required concession
imposed upon developers who are granted zoning benefits.271 Municipalities
often impose exactions on developers.272 Exactions can take various forms,
including in-kind dedications for infrastructure, such as roads, parks, and
schools,273 and “ in lieu”  fees for the same purpose. Exactions also include
impact fees, or special assessments, to cover the cost of development.274
The main goal of the imposition of exactions is “ to shift to the developer
the costs of the public infrastructure that the development requires.”275
Essentially, exactions force developers to internalize the “ external cost”
they impose on the surrounding community.
One might argue that since developers already pay for the cost they
impose on the surrounding community, there is no need to charge them for
the giving they receive. This argument, however, does not obviate the need
270. In Windfalls for Wipeouts, Frederik Jacobsen and Craig McHenry identify exactions as a
possible source of “ windfall recapture,”  but ultimately reject exactions as an inappropriate device
for that purpose. Frederik Jacobsen & Craig McHenry, Exactions on Development Permission, in
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at 342, 342-43, 364-66.
271. See supra notes 102, 110.
272. In a 1991 article, Vicki Been reported that eighty-nine percent of all communities
require dedications and that fifty-eight percent demand some sort of fees. Vicki Been, “Exit” as a
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 473, 481 n.42 (1991).
273. Reclamation law recapture is an analogous technique in which lands are seized based on
excess value created by reclamation projects. SeePaul Lowenberg, Betterment Recapture Under
Reclamation Law, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at 336, 336.
274. See JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 1032 (1998).
State courts characteristically uphold impact fees if there is adequate proportionality between the
fee and the additional burden imposed on the community as a result of the development. Id. at
1035.
275. Been, supra note 272, at 482. Been points out that shifting the cost to the developer is
desirable for several reasons.
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for a law of givings for two main reasons.276 First, exactions are required
only for a small segment of the spectrum of givings. Exactions are assessed
only when the municipality is required to make an additional investment in
infrastructure.277 In other cases, exactions are not imposed. Thus, if the
giving does not impose any direct cost on the municipality, no exaction will
be imposed, and the giving will manage to escape charge.
Second, and more importantly, exactions are not actually aimed at the
same problem as givings jurisprudence. Exactions only address out-of-
pocket costs incurred by the municipality as a result of givings.278 They do
not at all address the benefit that constitutes the giving. Put differently,
exactions only cover the expenses the surrounding community might incur
following certain givings, but not the opportunity cost to the community as
a result of bestowing the benefit. The remaining benefit to the recipient
remains unaccounted for, even if the benefit far outweighs the cost of
development. This leads to odd outcomes. Assume that the city of Bigburgh
decides to upzone Chris Constructor’s property, thereby bestowing upon
him $50 million in added value. Assume that Constructor’s construction of
the new Constructor Tower will result in greater need for municipal
services such as transportation and sanitation, requiring the municipality to
invest $2 million in infrastructure upgrades. By imposing an exaction on
Constructor, the municipality prevents Constructor from transferring a $2
million cost onto the municipality. The $50 million in zoning benefits
remains untouched.279
Our point is not to criticize the imposition of exactions. As should be
clear by now, our goal is to achieve full accounting for both the costs and
benefits of government action. Exactions are a step in the right direction.
However, as the above example illustrates, they fall short of satisfying the
need for a givings law.
In fact, the law of givings would prove useful in resolving some of the
difficulties currently plaguing the field of exactions. In the aftermath of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission280 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,281
276. Jacobsen and McHenry present a different set of objections to the use of exactions for
charging givings: The existing body of exactions law would make courts resistant to changing it to
conform to the needs of charging for givings; municipalities generally prefer to levy fees; and the
timing of exactions is too early in the municipal approval process. Jacobsen & McHenry, supra
note 270, at 365.
277. Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local
Governments’ Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 417 (1981); James C.
Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 85, 88 (1987).
278. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 277.
279. We assume here that the value of the zoning benefits in the hands of the municipality is
$50 million. We make no assumption concerning the value of the benefits in the hands of the
recipient.
280. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
281. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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exactions have been subject to special rationality and proportionality
requirements. Exactions that fail to meet the requirements are viewed as
regulatory takings, for which compensation must be paid.282 The scope of
Nollan’s and Dolan’s requirements have proven difficult to define, in light
of the fact that givings are so often paired with takings that there are an
enormous number of government actions that can be creatively described as
exactions.283 The necessity of drafting special requirements for exactions
would be eliminated if all givings and takings were properly accounted for.
In short, exactions are hardly an adequate replacement for a law of
givings. Indeed, the law of givings is, in some respects, a superior way of
examining exactions.
Similar observations may be made about increased property tax
payments that might result from givings. The $50 million increase in the
value of Constructor’s property will produce increased property tax
revenues for Bigburgh. However, unless the property tax rate is sufficiently
high that the present value of all property taxes is equal to the value of the
property itself (a highly unlikely occurrence), Constructor will be able to
pocket the difference between the tax payment and the actual increase in
property value resulting from the giving. If the annual property tax rate is
two percent of assessed value, for example, the present value of the
increased property tax payments will be only $12.5 million (assuming a
discount rate of eight percent). This contrasts with a charge of $50 million
if Constructor actually had to pay for the giving.
Special windfall taxes, if targeted specifically to the property owner’s
gain resulting from the giving, could resolve this difficulty; however,
depending on their magnitude and incidence, such windfall taxes would
either be inadequate, excessive, or indistinguishable from givings charges.
To see this, consider the following three cases.
First, windfall taxes could be assessed on all increases in property
value. This proposal stood at the center of the Uthwatt Report, produced in
England in 1942 and ultimately rejected.284 The Uthwatt Proposal sought to
incorporate the lessons of the English Town Planning Act of 1909, which
had sought to assess charges for regulatory and derivative givings in the
amount of fifty percent of the value of the giving (raised to seventy-five
percent in 1932). The Uthwatt Committee, concluding that the earlier Act
had been too difficult to administer, proposed levying a seventy five percent
windfall tax on all increases in urban property value not directly attributable
282. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
283. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 11; Fennell, supra note 61, at 9-11; cf. City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999) (holding that Dolan’s rough proportionality rule
is inapplicable to a takings claim based on denial of a development permit).
284. David Replogle, The Uthwatt Proposal, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at
422 (discussing the Final Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment,
otherwise known as the Uthwatt Proposal).
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to owner improvements. While the Uthwatt Proposal was never adopted in
England, a number of jurisdictions have adopted special capital and real
estate windfall taxes based upon similar ideas.285 It is evident that the
Uthwatt Proposal and its ilk are not a pure givings scheme in that they
ignore some kinds of givings (nonurban givings, for example, in the case of
Uthwatt), while taxing other gains in property value that are not givings. As
such they fall prey to the critique of property taxes stated above.
A second option for windfall taxes would be to assess windfall taxes in
the full amount of all givings, in response to all givings. Such a scheme has
never been adopted, and—presuming that the givings taxed would be those
givings that are properly taxable, in accord with the analysis we outline—
the result would be indistinguishable from our proposed law of givings,
other than terminologically.
Third, and finally, windfall taxes might be assessed on all properly
charged givings, but only upon a certain percentage of the value of the
givings, as in the Town Planning Act of 1909. Such taxes would be
indistinguishable from givings charges, reduced by a given percentage.
Certainly such taxes would represent an improvement, so long as they were
properly applied only to chargeable givings and, particularly, if the
proportion of the giving charged were symmetric to the proportion of
takings compensated. Nonetheless, depending on how such costs and
revenues are actually incorporated into citizens’ welfare functions and
government calculations, incomplete givings charges could fail to produce
optimal givings incentives because they would effect less-than-complete
internalization. The better alternative, then, is an explicit law of givings
with charges properly calibrated to creating an optimal amount of givings
by encouraging full accounting for their economic effects.
B. Baselines for Givings and Takings
The preceding discussion raises a more general question. Why should
givings beneficiaries be asked to pay for anything more than the costs they
impose on society? Why should the magnitude of the giving be measured
from the baseline of the immediately prior property and land-use scheme?
This objection might be a variant of a broader property-rights critique
of land-use law aimed at expanding takings compensation. The expansive
property-rights critique views property rights as absolute, subject only to
the traditional limitation of sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas (one should
285. Madelyn Glickfeld & Donald G. Hagman, Special Capital and Real Estate Windfalls
Taxes (SCREWTS), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at 437.
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use one’s property in such a manner as not to injure others’ interests).286 On
this view, the baseline from which givings and takings should be measured
is one in which property owners are subject to few limitations, and many
government actions that raise property values should be seen as removals of
wrongly uncompensated takings, rather than givings. In our example, the
advocate of this critique would argue that the $50 million addition to
Constructor Tower rightly belongs to Constructor, and that he should not be
asked to pay for anything other than the actual cost Constructor imposes on
society by way of required infrastructure improvements.
Another version of the objection might take precisely the opposite
view, positing that property rights are purely a creature of government
largesse and arguing that the baseline from which givings and takings
should be measured is a point of zero property rights.287 On this view,
Constructor should be charged for the full $50 million in value of the
benefit, but would not be entitled to compensation for downzoning.
In both versions of the objection, using the legal status quo ante as the
baseline for measuring givings and takings would be attacked as arbitrary
and unjust. We elected to use the status quo ante as the relevant benchmark,
nevertheless, because this is the baseline generally employed by the courts
in takings cases.288 As we have shown throughout this Article, takings and
givings are inextricably related. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to use
one baseline for takings compensation and another for givings charges.
Doing so would unnecessarily inject additional confusion and incoherence
into an already complex body of law. However, we do not argue that this is
the only baseline from which takings and givings should be measured.
Indeed, several programs for injecting market forces into zoning utilize
other baselines. For instance, zoning by eminent domain—which pays
compensation to homeowners subject to zoning for the economic impact of
the regulation without regard to whether the zoning would be considered a
regulatory taking—seems linked, at least conceptually, to a baseline of
property as essentially unlimited.289 Zoning by auction—which requires
homeowners to purchase in an auction all regulatory rights—meshes well
286. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3-31; Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not
a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L.
1095, 1147 & n.310 (1996).
287. Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 392-93 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987).
288. As Andrea Petersen has noted, the baseline understanding of property has also been the
source of some confusion in takings jurisprudence. Peterson, supra note 62, at 57.
289. A closely related technique is zoning by special assessment financed eminent domain,
which finances the compensation paid for zoning regulations by levying special assessments on
owners benefiting from the derivative givings created by the regulatory takings. Donald G.
Hagman, Zoning by Special Assessment Financed Eminent Domain (ZSAFED), in WINDFALLS
FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at 517, 517-18.
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with a baseline of property as limited only to those rights created by the
states.290 Either baseline would suit the law of givings, so long as it applied
to both givings and takings. However, transitioning to the new baseline
would involve substantial administrative costs and might upset prior
expectations.291
A related objection concerns the other end of the measuring stick for
givings and takings. The extent of the giving or taking has been measured
with reference to willingness to pay market value. This measure does not
include subjective and idiosyncratic value and may therefore lead to
insufficient charge or compensation.292
We do not deny the validity of this concern. The general critiques of
imprecise measurements in the law of takings naturally apply to the law of
givings as well, and we do not purport to resolve this puzzle. We simply
note the link between givings and takings measurements and follow
accepted takings measurements in the law of givings. Again, consistency
demands that the same method of calculating compensation or benefits be
employed for takings and givings. In addition, the conventional objection
that subjective value is unverifiable by third parties makes it extremely
unlikely that policymakers will ever choose to account for subjective harms
or benefits resulting from takings and givings. Just as imprecision in the
law of takings does not obviate the need for a takings jurisprudence,
parallel imprecision regarding givings does not avert the need for a givings
jurisprudence.
C. Administering Givings and Takings
Next, we address the concern that creating and administering a law of
givings is impractical and overly costly. In this Article, we have sketched
out the elements of a givings jurisprudence in order to show that it can be
290. See Madelyn Glickfeld, Sale of Development Permission: Zoning on the Auction Block,
in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 3, at 376; see also David E. Ervin & James B. Fitch,
Evaluating Alternative Compensation and Recapture Techniques for Expanded Public Control of
Land Use, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 29-33 (1979) (discussing both zoning by auction and
zoning by eminent domain and their possible connection to a scheme of “ windfalls for
wipeouts” ).
291. See Glickfeld, supra note 290, at 385.
292. One court has explained:
Compensation [for takings] in the constitutional sense is therefore not full
compensation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to
his property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to hi property.
Many owners are “ intramarginal,”  meaning that because of relocation costs,
sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their particular
(perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its market value
(i.e., it is not “ for sale” ).
Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988); see also JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1121-23 (4th ed. 1998); MICELI, supra note 159, at
138.
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implemented. The self-assessment system, in particular, is designed to
reduce administrative costs and to promote implementation. We make no
claims regarding the proper institution to implement the law of givings,
although we note that Hagman and Misczynski’s “ windfalls for wipeouts”
proposal appeared to assume a legislative source of legitimacy.293 Nor do
we seek to rewrite the scope of government in redistribution; rather, we aim
merely to make symmetrical limitations on the taking and giving powers of
the state.
Nevertheless, one important difference between givings and takings
must be acknowledged. Self-assessment for takings compensation should
have the side effect of eliminating de minimis claims for compensation
because property owners will not prepare self-assessment takings reports if
the cost of reporting and obtaining compensation exceeds the actual
compensation reward. No such incentive is present regarding self-
assessment for givings charges. This problem might be rectified by adding a
de minimis exception to the givings assessment requirement.294 The
government, for example, could exempt givings from charge if they were
lower than a given value.295 This exemption could serve a function similar
to minimum income requirements for income tax reporting in reducing
transaction costs and eliminating overly small claims. The exemption could
also be cast as a standard deduction, allowing even those who are required
to file self-assessments to deduct a certain amount from the charge in order
to cover administrative costs.296
D. Charges and Alternative Remedies
Another potential objection focuses on our choice of remedy. We
propose a fair charge as the correct remedial measure for objectionable
givings. One could argue, however, that injunctions, not charges, are the
adequate remedy for givings. This objection draws on cases, such as
Mahon, in which the Supreme Court struck down a regulation that unduly
diminished property values.297 Reasoning by analogy, one could propose
that whenever the state engages in a “ chargeable giving”  the government
act should be invalidated.
293. Hagman & Misczynski, supra note 224, at 31.
294. Cf. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1008-09 (1999) (calling for the introduction of a “de minimis”
exception into takings doctrine, and explaining why such an exception is desirable).
295. Hagman and Misczynski suggest an exemption for givings or takings of less than ten
percent of the value of the property prior to the government action, although it is not clear how
their rule would work when the giving consists of entirely new property. Hagman & Misczynski,
supra note 224, at 60.
296. Cf. I.R.C. § 63(c) (2000) (establishing a standard deduction for the income tax).
297. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (voiding the Kohler Act).
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Indeed, some states already bar public gifts, i.e., gifts by the
government to private entities.298 The constitution of the State of
Washington, for example, provides that “ [n]o county, city, town or other
municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan
its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm.”299
Although such state restrictions generally remain unenforced, they have
occasionally been utilized by courts to bar givings. For example, in 1966,
the Florida Supreme Court invalidated a municipal bond issue on the
ground that the funds could not constitutionally be dedicated to building a
spring training baseball facility for the Pittsburgh Pirates.300
Nevertheless, we submit that for both doctrinal and policy reasons,
charges are the preferable method of treating givings. To be sure, we do not
argue that givings should never be enjoined. Clearly, not all givings are
permissible. For example, givings that violate the Establishment, Due
Process, or Equal Protection Clauses by favoring a certain group based on
religion, race, or gender should certainly be invalidated.301 Yet, for the
reasons that follow, enjoining the government should be the exception
rather than the rule. First, the injunction of regulation that goes beyond the
legitimate limits of the police power has been criticized as wrong and
baseless. Several commentators have noted that regulation that goes “ too
far”  is simply a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.302 Indeed,
in recent cases, such as San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego303 and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,304 the Supreme Court seems to have adopted the view of the
298. See Michael J. Cremonese, Comment, Building New Stadiums with Your Money
Whether You Like It or Not: The Pennsylvania Constitution Does Not Prohibit the Use of Public
Funds To Construct New Stadiums, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 423, 434 n.118, 436 n.140 (1999).
299. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
300. Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1966) (concluding that
building a sports stadium for leasing to a private sports club is not a “ municipal purpose” ).
301. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(striking down a law drawn for the benefit of a religious sect).
302. See Robert I. McMurry, Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The
Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1982); E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REV. 287, 292 (1986). But
see Richard F. Babcock et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 211-12
(1984) (arguing that overzealous regulations are invalid rather than compensable); cf. Thomas E.
Schnur, Note, Compensation and Valuation for Regulatory Takings, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 931
(1986) (describing the controversy as a debate over whether takings are struck down as exceeding
the police power, or for failure to pay compensation for the exercise of eminent domain).
303. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this case involving open-spac
zoning, a five-Justice majority decided to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was premature.
In an important dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by three Justices, opined that the case was not
premature, and that if the challenged zoning regulation worked a taking, compensation was the
right remedy.
304. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that compensation is the remedy mandated by the
Constitution when a land use regulation works a taking).
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critics, stating that compensation, rather than injunctive relief, is the correct
remedy of aggrieved property owners. This new judicial trend is consistent
with both the language and goals of the Takings Clause.
In addition, there are weighty prudential reasons to adopt charges as the
appropriate remedies for givings. As we explained, bestowing benefits is an
integral part of government’s job.305 Barring the government from engaging
in givings would strip it of one of its most fundamental powers. It would
also deprive the public of the only effective means to overcome certain
collective-action and holdout problems. In a world replete with transaction
costs, the coercive power of the government is often the only viable way of
improving allocative efficiency,306 and, as we have shown, the government
must have both the power to take and the power to give in order to perform
its role successfully. Granted, it is important, for all the reasons we stated,
to impose a check on the power of the government to give. However,
injunctions are an unnecessarily harsh means of achieving this purpose.
Assessed adequately, charges provide an effective mechanism for forcing
government to internalize harms and benefits without unduly impairing its
ability to function. By requiring payments for benefits, charges force
beneficiaries to consider the cost they impose on the general public and
accept only givings that effect a net gain. The use of charges also
guarantees that when a giving is efficient, the public at large receives
adequate consideration in exchange for the giving. Moreover, charges
confer the decisionmaking power on the best decisionmaker: the individual
property owner. Under our scheme, recipients can reject refusable givings.
The ability to refuse the giving, and thus to avoid the charge, provides
property owners with sufficient protection against governmental abuse of
power. There is no reason, therefore, paternalistic or otherwise, to enjoin
the government from giving.
Indeed, the experience of state courts with constitutional restrictions on
public gifts suggests that a bar on givings is too blunt a tool. Courts faced
with public gifts questions must either find a sufficient public purpose and
allow the giving, despite its potential inefficiency, or find a private purpose
and bar the giving, despite its potential utility.307
305. See supra Section IV.A.
306. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1217 (1991); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
307. For discussion of courts’ construction of state constitutions’ public gifts provisions, see
Cremonese, supra note 298; and David D. Martin, Comment, Washington State Constitutional
Limitations on Gifting of Funds to Private Enterprise: A Need for Reform, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
199 (1996). Cf. Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, The Corporation Profits: The Emasculation of
the Public Purpose Doctrine and a Not-for-Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311 (1994)
(arguing for invalidating many givings on the ground of the lack of a “ public purpose” ).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we laid a foundation for a law of givings. Givings are
ubiquitous in practice and a theoretical inevitability. Yet, they have
received scant scholarly attention and no consistent doctrinal or theoretical
treatment. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has allowed takings
to hog the scholarly limelight, relegating givings to a dark corner of the
stage. There, givings have been patiently waiting to be discovered. In this
Article, we took a first step on the way to rectifying this disparate
treatment. Givings are a formative force in the world of property. Indeed, as
we showed, it is impossible to devise a comprehensive takings
jurisprudence without an understanding of the phenomenon of givings and
the relationship between givings and takings.
Givings and takings are mirror images of one another. The same policy
rationales that call for a takings law—namely, fairness, efficiency, and
public choice theory—also mandate a law of givings. The only major
difference is that while in the context of takings these underlying policy
rationales prescribe compensation, in the case of givings, they call for a
charge. By exploring takings law, identifying its essential doctrinal and
policy features, and adapting them as necessary, we developed some legal
tools to determine when a giving occurs and when a fair charge must be
assessed. Furthermore, we designed a three-step model of identifying,
assessing, and charging for givings, demonstrating the practical
administrability of a law of givings. A successful law of givings would
eliminate the lopsidedness of the property governance system where the
general public, via the government, bears the costs it imposes on
individuals, but does not share in the benefits it bestows. Charging for
givings would reduce interest-group politics, enhance the efficiency of
government decisions, and improve the fairness of our property system.
